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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial 
diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the 
most efficient policeman.3 
In legislating the pending bankruptcy “reform,” Congress has made many of the 
key decisions behind closed doors.  In fact, the process has been characterized as a 
congressional effort to pass a “stealth bankruptcy bill.”4  This secrecy brings into 
question the democratic nature of congressional deliberation.  Sadly, it also 
illustrates James Madison’s observation that “[a] popular Government, without 
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a 
Tragedy; or perhaps both.  Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people 
who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which 
knowledge gives.”5   
Open deliberation by legislative bodies is integral to representative democracy.6  
When the Framers designed the legislative branch, open debate was envisioned as 
the rule, not the exception.  The Framers intended for public policy to become law 
only after open debate and public hearings.  The Constitution was designed to foster 
the enactment of laws that are “not merely an expression of preferences driven by 
passion, but . . . reasoned, deliberate decisions.”7  Thus, it is a premise of our system 
of government that “public knowledge of the considerations upon which 
governmental action is based is essential to the democratic process.”8  The openness 
of American government has long been praised by commentators.  Alexis de 
Tocqueville wrote that the American system “is a conciliatory government under 
which resolutions have time to ripen, being discussed with deliberation and executed 
only when mature.”9  
                                                                
3JUSTICE LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1971) 
(1914), quoted in Marjorie Cohn, Open-and-Shut: Senate Impeachment Deliberations Must be 
Public, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 365, 397 (2000). 
4Stealth Bankruptcy Bill Moving Ahead: Causing Waves, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY NEWS, 
May 30, 2000. 
5Letter to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 
1910); Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the “Right to Know,” 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 1199, 1200 (1962) [hereinafter Open Meeting Statutes]. 
6Brian J. Caveney, More Sunshine in the Mountain State: The 1999 Amendments to the 
West Virginia Open Governmental Proceedings Act and Open Hospital Proceedings Act, 102 
W. VA. L. REV. 131, 132 (1999). 
7Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification 
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 n.130 (1999) (discussing 
bicameralism and presentment requirements of the Constitution). 
8Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1199, 1200.  
9ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Part I, 232 (Henry Steele ed., Henry 
Reeve trans., 1947), quoted in Michael B. Slade, Democracy in the Details: A Plea For 
Substance Over Form In Statutory Interpretation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 189 (2000). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/3
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Unfortunately, Congress has adopted a secretive, almost Court of Star Chamber-
like approach to pushing through recent bankruptcy legislation.  This secrecy is 
wholly inconsistent with the process of public deliberation which the Founders 
envisioned.  Rather, it is consistent with a Congress which appears to view the 
American people as subjects rather than citizens. 
Senator Russell Feingold has criticized the lack of open conference meetings on 
the bankruptcy bill as “legislating at its worst . . . .”10  Of course, it is much easier to 
legislate a bill if dissent and debate are discouraged.11  Rather than openly 
deliberating the merits of this legislation, Congress has instead used the cover of 
secrecy to adopt, wholesale, a bill largely created by lobbyists for special interests.  
This is a sharp reversal from the care which Congress formerly used to deliberate 
bankruptcy issues.  In the words of the dissenting members of the Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law who considered an earlier version of 
bankruptcy reform,  
[f]or nearly 100 years, Congress has carefully considered the bankruptcy 
laws and legislated on a deliberate and bipartisan basis.  In the past, 
Congress has elected also to carefully preserve an insolvency system, that 
provides for a fresh start for honest, hard-working debtors, protects 
ongoing businesses and jobs, and balances the rights of and between 
debtors and creditors.12 
This more deliberative approach to public policy formation is exemplified by the 
legislative process which led to the 1978 Bankruptcy Act.  It is said that when 
Congress addressed bankruptcy in the 1970’s, it undertook a balanced, professional, 
and unpoliticized approach.13  Both Houses of Congress undertook “intensive study” 
of changes to the bankruptcy laws.14  The Congress of the 1970’s evaluated and 
listened to the advice of the bench, the bar, academia, and the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission.15  Hearings were “extensive[,]” involving over 100 witnesses 
and 2,700 pages of testimony.16  The approach did not make use of secret conference 
committees.17  
Today’s efforts to reform bankruptcy commenced auspiciously with the work of 
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission.  This independent Commission was 
                                                                
10Kent Hoover, Foes: Bankruptcy Reform “Legislating at its Worst,” BUSINESS FIRST OF 
BUFFALO, May 15, 2000, at 21.  
11Slade, supra note 9, at 190. 
12146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9794 (2000) (statement of Representative Jackson-Lee).  
13Brady C. Williamson, Remarks from Views from the Bench (Sept. 15, 2000), at 
http://www.abiworld.org/reform/bradytalk.html. 
14LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App. Pt. 4(b)-201 (15th ed. 
rev’d 2001) [hereinafter B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY]. 
15B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 14, at App. Pt. 4-203; Bankruptcy:  The Next 20 
Years (Report of the National Bankruptcy Commission); G COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App. 
Pt. 44-8.1 (Oct. 20, 1997). 
16B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 14, at App. Pt. 4-202. 
17Willamson, supra note 13. 
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created by Congress in 1994 to examine the bankruptcy code.18  The Commission’s 
goal was to “sponsor a national dialogue on bankruptcy policy . . . .”19  Moreover, the 
Commission sought to “raise the public’s awareness of the causes and consequences 
of financial failure for American business and American families.”20  During 1996 
and 1997 the Commission conducted 21 public hearings, heard from 600 witnesses, 
and received over 2,300 submissions.21  This open process culminated in a 1300-
page report which contained 172 recommendations and a variety of dissenting 
opinions.22  Upon its completion, the Commission’s report was delivered to the 
President, Congress, and the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.23   
Once Congress took up the current bankruptcy reform, Congress largely removed 
the process from public view.  In a sharp departure from the decades-long 
congressional approach to bankruptcy legislation, “Congress stopped seeking expert 
advice and instead turned to special interest lobbyists . . . .”24  Thus, Congress 
utilized the cover of secrecy to boldly tailor the bankruptcy laws to serve special 
interests.  The result is “diametrically opposed to the approach recommended by the 
[National Bankruptcy Review] Commission[.]”25  As the late Professor Lawrence P. 
King observed in his final public speech, the philosophy of bankruptcy law 
could be summed up as granting a new financial life to a financially 
distressed debtor and providing for an equitable distribution of the 
debtor’s nonexempt assets among the debtor’s unsecured creditors.  At 
least that was the philosophy until the advent of the 105th, 106th, and the 
current 107th Congresses.  It seems that today’s philosophy is to damn the 
poor and struggling in order to pay the rich, who will not get paid 
anyway.26 
                                                                
18Id.; Tenn. Student Assistance Co. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433 n.4 (1998). 
19Willamson, supra note 13. 
20Id. 
21Id. 
22Id. 
23Id. 
24Alan N. Resnick, The Impact and Influence of Professor Lawrence P. King, 75 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 341, 345 (2001).  However, it was not the first time Congress gave into special 
interest demands in shaping the Bankruptcy Code.  See Nancy Blodgett, Bad Law? Brickbats 
for Bankruptcy Code, 70 A.B.A.J. 28 (1984) (quoting Professor King as criticizing the 1984 
Bankruptcy Code as “one of the sloppiest jobs Congress has ever done . . . . [t]he consumer 
credit industry, shopping center owners, farmers, fishermen, unions, the securities industry, 
and trial lawyers all put in their two cents.  It was not a matter of public policy but of who had 
the loudest voice and the greatest pull.”).   
25David Goch, Washington Report, COMMERCIAL LAW BULLETIN, Nov. / Dec. 1998, at 42-
43. 
26Lawrence P. King, Address at the American College of Bankruptcy Induction Ceremony 
(2001), in Professor Larry King’s final speech: ‘Give something back. That is the rallying 
cry.’, BANKRUPTCY COURT DECISIONS, WEEKLY NEWS & COMMENT, April 17, 2001, at A3; 
Resnick, supra note 24, at 348. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/3
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Consequently, “[t]he use of the term ‘bankruptcy reform’ is considered an oxymoron 
to most organizations of bankruptcy professionals . . . .  Virtually every group of 
bankruptcy professionals, regardless of the constituency represented, opposed both 
the substance of the legislation and the process . . . taken by Congress.”27  One 
member of Congress has even criticized the resulting bill as “not the product of a 
deliberative process, it is the off-spring of a rubber stamp bankruptcy reform [and it 
is] factory–manufactured . . . .”28 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 
Proponents of the current bankruptcy bill claim that the bill has been adequately 
deliberated because it has been through the Senate and House on three occasions.29  
During a Senate debate, Senator Hatch stated that “the bankruptcy reform legislation 
we are considering today is the same legislative language that was contained in the 
conference report passed by the Senate in December . . . .  [T]he language was 
marked up in the Judiciary Committee . . . .”30  Furthermore, Senator Grassley stated 
that since he and Senator Durbin introduced the bill two Congresses ago, the bill had 
been through subcommittee, full committee, in both the House and the Senate, and 
also the floor of both houses, through conference, and through passage by the House 
and Senate.31  Senator Biden argued that Senate bill 420 is the same bill “by and 
large, with a couple improvements that passed with 70 votes last year.”32 
However, despite the fact that this bill has been through three sessions of 
Congress, much of the key work on it has been both rushed and secretive.  This is 
true for each of the three years that Congress has entertained “Bankruptcy Reform.”  
In the 105th Congress the House “hurried [the] bill through,” and the Senate also 
“pressed toward hasty passage,”33 this is despite the fact that the bill engendered 
substantial criticism, including a letter deploring the bill signed by eighty-two law 
                                                                
27Goch, supra note 25. 
28146 Cong. Rec. H9788, H9793 (2000) (Statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
29Senator Sessions stated “this bill has cleared the Senate on at least three different 
occasions . . . and with large majorities.”  147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1925 (2001).  As this 
article goes to press, the fate of the bankruptcy bill is still uncertain.  Currently the bill is 
stalled in a “holding pattern” due to congressional disagreement about the bankruptcy 
treatment of debts incurred by protestors at abortion clinics.  (See American Bankruptcy 
Institute, http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/todayshead.html; see also Philip Shenon, Anti-
Abortion Lobbyists Tying Up Bankruptcy Overhaul Bill, NY TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002).  Although 
Congress may have had more open hearings on the bankruptcy bill in 2002 than it did in the 
immediately preceding years, that does not make up for the fact that the key provisions of the 
bill were apparently originally inserted at the behest of special interests under the cover of 
legislative secrecy.   
30147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1925 (2001). 
31147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1935 (2001). 
32147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1952 (2001). 
33Russ Feingold, Lobbyists’ Rush for Bankruptcy Reform, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 7, 
1999, at A19. 
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professors.34  Although both Houses appointed members to serve on a Conference 
Committee, there was no real conference.35  There were no public Conference 
Committee meetings.36  There were no Conference Committee meetings at all 
involving members of Congress from the minority.37  
Again in the 106th Congress, the official Conference Committee met in name 
only.38  Instead, Congress implemented an informal “shadow” conference committee 
to exclude the minority from negotiations on the bill.39  Members of Congress were 
excluded from these months-long secret negotiations, yet insiders were allowed to 
attend.40  The negotiations in the shadow conference were behind closed doors,41 
“cloaked in secrecy.”42  In 2001 proponents of bankruptcy reform planned yet again 
to push legislation through via a shadow conference.43  Traditionally, conferences are 
open to the public.44  The secret meeting of members of  Congress made it difficult to 
obtain information about the shaping of the legislation.45  Secret committee meetings 
are usually only held for military and intelligence matters.46  That it was the de facto 
                                                                
34Re: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (S.625), available at http://www.abiworld.org/ 
legis/profcrit.html.  Professors criticized it as filled with “provisions that tighten the screws on 
families who legitimately need debt relief,” and containing “cumbersome requirements.”  Id. 
35Brady C. Williamson, Remarks at The University of Texas School of Law (Nov. 16, 
2001) (draft on file with the authors).  Mr. Williamson was Chairman of the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission. 
36Id. 
37Id. 
38Id. 
39Leahy Responds to Sensenbrenner Request to Begin Reconciliation, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, July 24, 2001; Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by 
Congress, TIME, May 15, 2000 64 (“[n]ow members of both chambers are meeting in secret 
. . . .”); Countdown to PTNR, Gas Tax Fight Livens a Pre-Recess Week, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S 
CONGRESS DAILYPM, April 10, 2000 1 (discussing “behind the scenes negotiations”); Pamela 
Barnett, As Deadline Nears, Bankruptcy Bill Shows Signs of Life, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S 
CONGRESS DAILYPM, April 10, 2000 3 (labeling the “behind-the-scenes negotiations” as a 
“non-conference[.]”). 
40Stealth bankruptcy bill moving ahead, causing waves, supra note 4. 
41Pamela Barnett, Another ‘Shadow’ Conference Expected on Bankruptcy, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, March 20, 2001.  See John C. Henry, House Gives Approval to 
Bankruptcy Reform, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, October 13, 2000, at Business p.1. 
42Stealth Bankruptcy Bill Moving Ahead, Causing Waves, supra note 4. 
43Barnett, supra note 41. 
44Ed Roberts, Last-Ditch Effort Made to Save Bankruptcy Bill, CREDIT UNION JOURNAL, 
May 8, 2000, at 1. 
45Marcy Gordon, House Passes Bankruptcy Bill; Clinton Threatens Veto, THE RECORD, 
October 13, 2000, at B4. 
46Allison C. Giles, The Value Of Nonlegislators’ Contributions To Legislative History, 79 
GEO. L.J. 359 n.134 (1990). 
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conference committee that met in secret is particularly troubling, for conference 
committees are especially powerful. 
III.  THE SPECIAL POWER OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEES 
Most congressional work is done in committee.47  Conference committees are 
typically used by Congress to iron out the discrepancies between the different House 
and Senate versions of a bill.48  Conference committees are typically used for 
complex legislation.49  A conference committee is effectively comprised of two 
committees, one from each house.50  Each committee votes separately by majority 
vote.51  Conference committees can last anywhere from hours to months, and there is 
no set requirement for the number of representatives and senators on a conference 
committee.  In recent years they have ranged in size from six to two hundred 
members.52  Conference committees have no set pattern.53  No rules apply.54  Often 
neither transcripts nor summaries are provided to the public.55  The only explanation 
the public often gets to see of the mysterious workings of a secret conference 
committee is the conference report and its accompanying documents, which are often 
“murky.”56  When a conference is complete, the House and Senate vote on the results 
as a whole, in an all-or-nothing fashion.57  One commentator describes the typical 
conference committee as “a shadowy arm of Congress, composed of a handful of 
senior members who hold secret, late-night meetings to mull over key questions of 
federal policy.  No rules govern their activities, and once they’ve made their 
decisions, their legislative handiwork is presented to rank-and-file lawmakers on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”58  In the words of one Senator, conference committees are 
so powerful that they are the part of Congress “least accountable to the public, [that] 
                                                                
47Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1204; John J. Watkins, Open Meetings Under 
the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 ARK. L. REV. 268, 272 (1984). 
48Richard E. Cohen, The Third House Rises, 33 NAT’L J., Vol. 33, No. 30 (2001).  An 
alternative to the conference committee process often used when Congress is pressed for time 
is a “ping-pong” of messengers between the open House and open Senate.  Id. 
49Cohen, supra note 48. 
50Charles W. Johnson, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE 37 (2000), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.toc.html. 
51Id. 
52Cohen, supra note 48. 
53Id. 
54Id.  Technically there are rules that apply, see infra notes 65, 90 and text.  But in practice 
the rules of procedure are frequently ignored. 
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Cohen, supra note 48; Johnson, supra note 50; Bankruptcy Bill Ready to Head to House-
Senate Conference?, 2000 ABI JNL Lexis 4, *2. 
58Cohen, supra note 48. 
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. . . afford special interests many opportunities to influence legislation.”59  In short, 
the conference committee is the “last bastion of secrecy in a lawmaking process that 
is supposed to operate in the sunshine.”60  This secrecy is significant because 
conference committees are becoming increasingly important in the legislative 
process.61  Such is the power of congressional committees that they are referred to as 
“the Third House of Congress,” “the Supreme Court of legislation.”62   
The shadow conference on Bankruptcy reform was in contravention of the 
“regular process by which the House and Senate reconcile the differences between 
bills, which requires public debate on the floor, which provides the minority the right 
to raise its concerns on the floor and insist on a vote, which requires a vote of the 
members to go to conference, and which requires at least one open and public 
meeting . . . .”63  In short, congressional leaders decided to pass the bill by ignoring 
the rules of congressional procedure at the expense of a fair, open process.64  The 
House rules do not provide for such a shadow conference, and neither the House nor 
the Senate ever voted to go to conference as required.65 
In the words of one commentator, “[u]sually . . . compromises are worked out in 
a conference committee with duly appointed members from both legislative bodies 
and at least the appearance of public scrutiny.  But not so for the bankruptcy bill, 
which . . . virtually bypass[ed] the conference process by being attached as a last 
minute rider to a bill ready to leave its conference committee.”66  Congress 
                                                                
59Cohen, supra note 48, citing SENATOR WELLSTONE, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL. 
60William Safire, Essay, Stop Conference Roulette, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2001, A29. 
61Society of Prof. Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp 569, 572 (D. Utah 1985), 
citing Watkins, supra note 47, at 271. 
62Cohen, supra note 48; Johnson, supra note 50, at 37.  Abuse of the conference 
committee process is detrimental to our system of representative democracy.  In the words of 
the Parliamentarian of the U.S. House of Representatives,  
[o]ne of the most practical safeguards of the American democratic way of life is this 
legislative process that with its emphasis on the protection of the minority, gives 
ample opportunity to all sides to be heard and make their views known.  The fact that 
a proposal cannot become a law without consideration and approval by both Houses of 
Congress is an outstanding virtue of our bicameral legislative system.  
Charles W. Johnson, Guide to Legislative Process in the House, at http://www.house.gov/ 
ruleslph-fore.htm (last modified Jan. 1997).  
63Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Statement by Rep. Jerrold Nadler Condemning the Bankruptcy 
“Shadow Conference,” at http://www.abiworld.org/research/nadler.html (May 2, 2000). 
64Id.  
65Id.  According to the Parliamentarian of the U.S. House of Representatives,  
[t]he rules of the House require that one conference meeting be open, unless the 
House, in open session, determines by a record vote that a meeting will be closed to 
the public.  When the report of the conference committee is read in the House, a point 
of order may be made that the conferees failed to comply with the House rule 
requiring an open conference meeting.  If the point of order is sustained, the 
conference report is considered rejected by the House . . . . 
Johnson, supra note 50, at 37. 
66Stealth Bankruptcy Bill Moving Ahead, Causing Waves, supra note 4. 
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substituted the bankruptcy bill for an unrelated State Department funding bill which 
had already passed both chambers of Congress.67  This highly unusual procedural 
tactic was designed to facilitate passage of the bankruptcy bill.68  This procedural 
end-run allowed the Bankruptcy bill to bypass at least five opportunities for filibuster 
in the Senate.69  As one former Senator states, “I thought I’d seen every trick in the 
book, but attaching a secretly negotiated Bankruptcy bill to completely unrelated 
legislation already in conference is unbelievable.”70 
IV.  CRITICISM WITHIN CONGRESS 
The Senate version was shaped by a small group of Senators in what both 
Senators Feingold and Feinstein referred to as a “shadow conference.”71  Senate 
negotiators in the shadow conference made “significant concessions to their House 
counterparts[,]” resulting in legislation “much harsher than the bill [the entire 
Senate] adopted . . . .”72  Perhaps this is because “by some accounts, lobbyists for the 
credit card industry . . . literally helped draft sections of the pending legislation.”73  
Even congressional proponents of bankruptcy reform admit that the legislation was 
largely shaped by the financial services industry.74  This is in sharp contrast to the 
shaping of bankruptcy legislation in 1978.  Although the 1978 Bankruptcy Code 
legislation was influenced by lobbyists, they did not dominate the process.75  In the 
words of Senator Feingold,  
                                                                
67Henry, supra note 41. 
68Id. 
69Id. 
70Stealth Bankruptcy Bill Moving Ahead, Causing Waves, supra note 4 (statement of 
retired Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum.). 
71147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1950 (2001); 147 CONG. REC. S2343, S2375 (2001). 
72Wellstone, Feingold Urges Clinton to Veto Bankruptcy Bill, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S 
CONGRESS DAILY, May 18, 2000. 
73Williamson, supra note 13.  Unfortunately, lobbyists who perform the work of Congress 
are not unique to bankruptcy reform.  In the words of one observer, “some . . . lobbyists 
actually resent members of Congress . . . interfering with what they view as their legislation 
. . . . [W]e have . . . reached a point where legislative history must be ignored because not even 
the hands of congressional staff have touched committee reports.”  William F. Patry, 
Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 139, 140 (1996).   
74According to Rep. Gekas, “[c]redit unions have played a critical role in shaping this 
bill[.]” Ed Roberts, CUNA’s Influence Seen as Bankruptcy Vote Nears, CREDIT UNION 
JOURNAL, Feb. 26, 2001, at 1.  Although credit unions are normally political allies of 
consumer groups, the Credit Union National Association [hereinafter CUNA] elected to side 
with the American Bankers Association in working to thwart the recommendations made by 
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission.  Id.  CUNA lobbyists met secretly with 
lobbyists from the American Bankers Association in “working to draft priorities for 
legislation.”  Id.  Credit union lobbyists succeeded in inserting a special reaffirmation 
exception into the bill which allows credit unions “to use a short form with fewer 
disclosures[,]” thus encouraging debtors to reaffirm their debts to credit unions.  Id. 
75Williamson, supra note 13. 
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[A]mending the bankruptcy code used to be a nonpartisan exercise, where 
the Congress listened to experts--practitioners and law professors and 
judges and trustees, and made careful considered judgments about how 
the law should work.  Now it seems as if we ignore the experts and 
instead do what the credit industry wants us to do.  We use parliamentary 
tactics to avoid reasoned consideration.  Those tactics harm the bill, and 
discredit the Senate.76  
Similarly, Senator Wellstone observed:  
[T]his bill was negotiated by only a small group of Members, out of the 
public eye. . . . [U]ntil this year, it had never been [before the full Senate] 
in an amendable fashion . . . .  [U]ntil a hearing was held by the Judiciary 
Committee on February 8, there had been no hearings on this legislation.  
In fact, the Senate had not conducted its own hearing on bankruptcy since 
1988 . . . .   
So I see a compelling reason for some . . . debate on this bill.  The bill 
deserves scrutiny.  It should be held up to the light of day so that citizens 
can see what an ill-made misshapen attempt at reform this legislation is.   
Colleagues in this body need to understand what bad legislation really is, 
how terrible an impact a piece of legislation such has this can have on 
America’s most powerless families, and what a complete giveaway this 
piece of legislation is to banks, to credit card companies, and to other 
lenders.77 
The fact that the bill had not been before the full Senate in an amendable fashion 
is significant because as Senator Feingold notes, the current Senate bill is basically 
the same as the one vetoed by former President Clinton.78  There is an indication that 
members of Congress intentionally inserted extreme provisions into that bill for 
tactical reasons, so as to stake out a negotiating position against the President.79  The 
Senate knew the bill would be vetoed.80 
Most significantly, the bill suffered many adverse changes in the secret 
Conference Committee.  As Senator Durbin stated, the more balanced bankruptcy 
bill which received substantial support on the floor of the Senate “went into the meat 
grinder of the conference committee and came out loaded with provisions which . . . 
                                                                
76147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1947 (2001). 
77147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1929 (2001). 
78147 CONG. REC. S1925-02, S1947 (2001). 
79According to Senator Feingold, “[i]n the past two Congresses, it has been my impression 
that the Republican majority has made decisions on the substance of this bill in order to stake 
out a negotiating position vis-a-vis the White House.  Twice it has ignored the work done by 
the Senate on the floor and come up with a conference vehicle that was designed to provoke a 
veto.”  147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1946 (2001). 
80Senator Murray stated that the Senate knew the conference report would be vetoed by 
the president.  146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11728 (2000). 
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were unfair to consumers. . . .”81  In short, the more even-handed bill was “decimated 
in conference.”  The most recent iteration of this bill may still become the new 
Bankruptcy Code.82 
Among the provisions changed by the secret Conference Committee:  the 
Committee removed the cap on homestead exemptions which had previously been 
approved by the senate 76-22.83  The Committee removed a provision which ensured 
that judgments entered under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act could 
not be discharged in bankruptcy.84  A requirement that Internet credit card 
solicitations contain advice about using credit cards was deleted.85  An amendment 
which would have prevented credit card companies from charging interest 
retroactively was removed.86  An amendment requiring a study to determine if credit 
card companies use zip codes to determine credit worthiness was omitted.87  Senator 
                                                                
81147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1938 (2001). 
82Both chambers of the 107th Congress approved respective bankruptcy bills in March of 
2001.  Sensenbrenner to Set Bankruptcy Conference, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, 
Nov. 2, 2001.  There were approximately forty significant differences between the House and 
Senate Versions.  Bankruptcy Conferees Make Little Progress in Reconciling Bills, THE 
BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Nov 15, 2001.  The Conference Committee had been scheduled to 
meet to reconcile these differences on September 12, 2001.  Bankruptcy Conference May 
Resume as Netting Bill Considered, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 30, 2001. 
Proponents such as Senator Grassley hoped to avoid an open Conference once more in 2001 
through procedural machinations.  Barnett, supra note 41.  See Supporters of Bankruptcy 
Reform Remain Hopeful, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, September 11, 2001. 
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress indefinitely postponed the 
Conference.  Bankruptcy Slips From Congressional Agenda in Wake of Terrorism, at 
http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/01sept17.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2001).  Yet by 
November 14, the Conference Committee was back at work.  Partisan Rhetoric Returns with 
Bankruptcy Bill, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY NEWS, Nov. 27, 2001.  The Committee is 
comprised of nineteen House members and thirteen Senators.  Congressional Bankruptcy 
Panel Convenes, THE DAILY DEAL, Nov. 14, 2001.  At least six of these members of Congress 
“steadfastly oppose” the bill. Id.  Detractors of the bill want the Conference Committee to re-
evaluate the entire bill in light of the current recession.  Outlook Uncertain for Bankruptcy 
Reform Effort, AUSTIN BUS. J., Nov. 23, 2001, at 10.  Ironically, supporters of the bill now 
want to limit the scope of the Conference Committee’s deliberations to differences between 
the House and Senate versions of the bill.  Id; Bankruptcy Conferees Make Little Progress in 
Reconciling Bills, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 15, 2001. 
Proponents of altering our bankruptcy system face a political obstacle in the current 
economic downturn.  “Giving creditors more power to collect debt might not be good politics 
at a time like this.”  Outlook Uncertain for Bankruptcy Reform Effort, AUSTIN BUS. J., Nov. 
23, 2001, at 10.  Nonetheless, proponents considered inserting parts of the bankruptcy reform 
bill in unrelated legislation.  Consumer Bankruptcy after 9-11-01, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
NEWSM, Oct. 17, 2001.  And the consumer credit industry is expected to push for bankruptcy 
reform yet again in 2002.  Id.   
83146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11726 (2000). 
84Id. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11728 (2000).  
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Durbin’s amendment to curtail a predatory lending practice aimed at the elderly was 
“adopted unanimously on a previous bill [yet] was stripped out in conference.”88  
The Conference report also omitted an amendment that would have allowed 
fishermen to use chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code.89 
Even worse, the Committee used the cover of secrecy to improperly insert 
legislation favorable to special interests. Normally the matters that conferees are 
allowed to consider are “strictly limited” to matters on which the two Houses 
disagree.90  Conferees are ordinarily prohibited from inserting new matter beyond the 
scope of the differences between the two Houses.91  Yet with the bankruptcy bill, 
Senator Feingold noted that several provisions simply “appeared out of nowhere[,]” 
and were not contained in previous bills.92  Representative Watt also stated “there 
were some provisions . . . that just appeared out of nowhere in the course of the 
conference . . . .  They just like magic appeared.”93  One example is the provision 
entitled “Protection of Retirement Savings in Bankruptcy” which oxymoronically 
imposes a cap upon the amount of retirement savings which debtors can keep beyond 
the reach of creditors.94  
Another example of “lawmaking at its worst” was the provision to assist 
investors in Lloyds of London.95  Senator Feingold states that there were no hearings 
on the Lloyds’ provision, it did not come out of Committee, nor did it come out of 
the Senate or House.96  Instead, it was “just slipped into the bill at the last minute.”97  
Additionally the cap on the homestead exemption was watered down during the 
“shadow conference.”98  Virtually all these substantive changes enacted by the secret 
Committee acted to benefit the credit card and banking industries.  Senator Feingold 
explained this phenomenon by stating that “[p]owerful economic interests see an 
opportunity to push through major structural changes to the bankruptcy system 
before the public becomes aware of the consequences of what they are doing and 
                                                                
88147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1941 (2001). 
89146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11727 (2000). 
90Johnson, supra note 50, at 37. 
91Id.  If a conference committee introduces extraneous material not committed to by either 
House, the conference committee is not in order.  Id.  A point of order may be made to reject 
such extraneous material.  Id. at 38-41.  
92147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1948. (2001). 
93Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, Hearings Before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 333, 107th Cong. 1, 232 (2001) (statement of Rep. Watt), 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju71179.000/hju71179_0f.htm 
(last visited Feb 8, 2001). 
94147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1948 (2001).  
95147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1950 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
96147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1951 (2001).  
97Id. 
98147 CONG. REC. S2324, S2334 (2001). 
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works to stop them.”99  In short, it was an effort to “hijack the legislative process for 
the self-interested purposes of a single industry.”100   
What motivated Congress to railroad bankruptcy reform through a secret 
committee?  One commentator observes that, although neither the legislative process 
nor members of Congress are corrupt, there is “no escaping the fact that financial 
institutions . . . have made significant contributions to well-placed members of 
Congress of both parties.”101  Prior to Senate votes on the bill, MBNA Corporation 
contributed $250,000 to the Republican Senatorial committee, and $150,000 to the 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.102  Such was the largesse of the 
financial services industry that one congressional staff member who worked on the 
legislation observed “[i]f this were NASCAR, the members would have to have the 
corporate logos of their sponsors sewn to their jackets.”103   
The most disturbing example is the recent revelation that in 1998, MBNA 
Corporation loaned $447,500 to Representative James P. Moran Jr. just four days 
before Representative Moran emerged as one of the lead sponsors of the bankruptcy 
bill.104  Representative Moran stated that the timing of the loan was “wholly 
coincidental”105 and that “[t]here was no connection with my sponsoring bankruptcy 
[reform] and this loan . . . .”106 
Yet the loan was the largest refinancing package given by MBNA to any 
individual debtor that year.107  MBNA made this loan despite the fact that MBNA’s 
own rating system ranked the congressman’s credit score at the bottom 14th 
percentile of American consumers, with a 40% chance of default.108  Moreover, 
critics allege that the terms of the loan were overly generous:  the interest rate was 
unusually low, and MBNA appraised the congressman’s home at too high a value.109  
MBNA’s spokesman defends its loan to the congressman by stating “we thought this 
was a good business deal.”110 
Perhaps it was.  The loan from MBNA may well have enabled the congressman 
to avoid default, thus allowing him to subsequently state to his colleagues in 
                                                                
99Feingold, supra note 33. 
100Id. 
101Williamson, supra note 13. 
102Roberts, supra note 44; Bartlett & Steele, supra note 39. 
103Bartlett & Steele, supra note 39. 
104Jo Becker & Spencer S. Hsu, Credit Firm Gave Moran Favorable Loan Deal; 
Lawmaker Supported Finance Industry Bill, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 2002 A01. 
105Philip Shenon, Bankruptcy Bill Opponents Criticize Loan, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
August 9, 2002 A11. 
106Becker & Hsu, supra note 104. 
107Shenon, supra note 105; Becker & Hsu, supra note 104. 
108Becker & Hsu, supra note 104. 
109Becker & Hsu, supra note 104. 
110Report: Moran championed lender’s cause after receiving loan, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 
STATE & LOCAL WIRE, July 6, 2002 (statement of Brian Dalphon). 
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Congress that “the current bankruptcy system is broken” and that “the time-honored 
principle of moral responsibility and personal obligation to pay one’s debts has been 
eroded by the convenience and ease with which one can discharge his or her 
obligations.”111 
Overall, the financial services industry showered members of Congress with 
more than $23.4 million.112  In short, the lobbying efforts involved a “sophisticated 
public-relations blitz” which lobbied for changes to our bankruptcy laws.113 
Even sponsors of the bill are befuddled about the origin of special interest 
provisions within the bill.  When Representative Watt enquired as to who inserted 
the special interest provision dealing with Lloyds, Representative Gekas replied “I’m 
not certain . . . .  But I must tell you . . . in the interest of getting the . . . reform 
passed, that I acceded to this insertion.”114 
Apparently while the special interest lobbyists understand this bill, Congress does 
not.115  In the words of Senator Feingold, “[t]his is an immensely complicated bill 
about a very technical area of the law.  There are provisions in the bill that . . . no 
one in the Senate really understands.”116  
Senator Leahy recounted how the bill moved through the secret conference 
committee: 
                                                                
111Shenon, supra note 105 
112Lisa Fickenscher, Bankruptcies Down; Enthusiasm for Reform Wanes, AM. BANKER., 
Sept. 30, 1999.  The lobbying campaign included the credit industry’s placement of 
advertisements pushing bankruptcy reform in publications read by members of Congress such 
as Roll Call and Congress Daily.  Id.  The financial industry also placed ads in national 
newspapers and funded studies to support bankruptcy reform.  Bartlett & Steele, supra note 
39. 
113Bartlett & Steele, supra note 39; Common Cause, BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION ENTERS 
FINAL STAGES; CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY GAVE $7.5 MILLION IN CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1999, ACCORDING TO COMMON CAUSE 1 (2000).  Common Cause also 
noted that the five “shadow conferees” on bankruptcy reform received $854,789 from creditor 
interests.  Id. at 3-4. 
114Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, Hearings Before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 333, supra note 93, at 485 (The Lloyds provision was 
ultimately taken out.). 
115Senator Feingold criticized the influence of special interests upon bankruptcy reform, 
stating “[w]e have no idea what other provisions written by the credit card companies will be 
sneaked onto that bill.”  Hoover, supra note 10, at 21. 
116147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1950 (2001).  One wonders how a court is to discern 
congressional intent when much of Congress’s work on the statute was secret.  When parties 
ignore congressional intent in bankruptcy it undermines stability, increases costs, and leads to 
interpretive disputes.  Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An 
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 177-79 
(2000).  Interpretive disputes are particularly problematic in corporate bankruptcy. Id. When 
interpretive disputes foster litigation, the litigation expenses detract from the estate’s already 
limited resources.  Id.  The cost of increased litigation can make the difference between 
reorganization and liquidation.  Id.  “Every dollar spent litigating is a dollar removed from an 
asset base that is already inadequate to satisfy claims.”  Id. at 178.  In short, a statute where 
Congress hides its legislative intent may be particularly problematic when the statute relates to 
corporate bankruptcy.  
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The Senate had requested a conference in August 1999 on legislation to 
enhance security of U.S. missions . . . .  That did not proceed.  On October 
11, 2000, the House appointed conferees not from the committee with 
jurisdiction over any embassy security issues, but from the House 
Judiciary Committee.  Then a few hours later, out of nowhere, the 
leadership filed a conference report that strikes every aspect of the 
underlying legislation on which the two Houses had gone to conference 
and put in this wholly unrelated matter with reference to a bankruptcy bill 
that had not even passed.  It had only been introduced that day.  There was 
no debate, nothing.  It is like: Whoops, open the closet door, let the 
special interests out, slam it down, and please pass it . . . .  [This was] an 
autocratic, behind-closed-doors, undemocratic process, and it makes a 
mockery of the legislative process.117 
Afterwards, the House voted 398-1 for an open Committee hearing.  But two 
hours after the House vote, the sham conference report was filed.118  Senator 
Wellstone deplored the process: 
Let me say a few words about the process on this legislation, which is 
terrible.  The House and Senate Republicans have taken a secretly 
negotiated bankruptcy bill and stuffed it into the State Department 
authorization bill in which not one provision of the original bill remains.  
Of course, State Department authorization is the last of many targets.  The 
majority leader has talked about doing this on an appropriations bill, on a 
crop insurance bill, on the electronic signatures bill, on the Violence 
Against Women Act.  So desperate are we to serve the big banks and 
credit card companies that no bill has been safe from this controversial 
baggage.  
We are again making a mockery of scope of conference.  We are 
abdicating our right to amend legislation.  We are abdicating our right to 
debate legislation.  And for what?  Expediency.  Convenience.  
However, I am not sure that we have ever been so brazen in the past.  
Yes we have combined unrelated, extraneous measures into conference 
reports.  Usually because the majority wishes to pass one bill using the 
popularity of another.  Putting it into a conference report makes it 
privileged.  Putting into a conference report makes it unamenable.  So 
they piggy back legislation. Fine. But this may be the first time in the 
Senate’s history where the majority has hollowed out a piece of legislation 
in conference--left nothing behind but the bill number--and inserted a 
completely unrelated measure . . . .  The game is how to move legislation 
through the Senate with as little interference as possible from actual 
Senators.”119 
                                                                
117146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11692 (2000). 
118Id. 
119146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000). 
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V.  BANKRUPT EMBASSIES? 
The use of the American Embassy Security Act to railroad the bankruptcy bill 
through Congress is so extraordinary and remarkable that it bears further 
examination.  Commenting on this unprecedented procedural ploy, Senator Leahy 
inquired: 
[T]his was not a case where . . . the embassies were all going bankrupt?  
The embassy in London or in Moscow or, heaven forbid, in Dublin, might 
be in bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York?  That is not 
the case?120  
Senator Wellstone replied, “I say to my colleague from Vermont that argument 
has not been made.  So far, that argument has not been made.”121 
 
Senator Leahy continued, 
I thank my friend from Minnesota.  I appreciate his pointing this out.  I 
just want students who might look at this afterward and wonder what 
bankruptcy has to do with embassies to go back and read what the 
distinguished Senator from Minnesota says, which is, of course, that it has 
absolutely nothing to do with embassies.  It is a parliamentary trick to get 
a piece of special interest legislation through.122 
Here is how bankruptcy reform was substituted for the American Embassy 
Security Act:  Representative Chabot offered a motion to agree to the conference.123  
Then he yielded all the time to himself.124  In effect, he would have denied the 
minority time to debate the bill.125  Representatives from the minority strenuously 
objected.  Representative Conyers pointed out that it is traditional that the minority 
receive half of the time for debate.126  An agreement was reached that the minority 
would have ten minutes of time (instead of the thirty minutes it would ordinarily be 
entitled to.)127  Representative Gekas indicated that not permitting the minority to 
debate was acceptable because of a prior gentleman’s agreement.128  However, at 
least one member of the House was not aware of any such prior agreement.129  Then, 
Representative Conyers noted that “the State Department authorization has already 
been enacted.”  An excerpt from the exchange that followed is informative: 
                                                                
120146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11692 (2000). 
121Id. 
122Id. 
123146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9788 (2000). 
124Id. 
125146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9788-89 (2000) (statements of Reps. Nadler, Conyers, and 
Gejdenson). 
126146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9788 (2000). 
127Id. 
128Id. 
129146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9789 (2000). 
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Mr. CONYERS.  I could give the gentleman the answer as well, but the 
question is, is this bill before us merely a vehicle to enact the bankruptcy 
provisions? 
Mr. GEKAS. No, not merely. 
Mr. CONYERS. Not merely.  What else? 
Mr. GEKAS. It depends on what the word “else” means and what “is” 
means.  But at this point it is not merely to put in the bankruptcy. 
Mr. CONYERS. Yes that is very good. 
Mr. Speaker, this is a very poor process, as everybody on the floor has 
already noted.  This is totally against tradition, to attempt to move this 
measure of bankruptcy into a measure that has already been passed into 
law.  This is incredible . . . .130  
Later, Representative Nadler inquired of Representative Gekas “[w]hat on earth 
does this have to do with the State Department authorization?”131  The response of 
Representative Gekas merits careful reading: “it has to do with the search for better 
government within the Congress of the United States, in the realm of the State 
Department and in the realm of bankruptcy reform, and for the good of our people 
who demand action on the State Department and on bankruptcy reform.”132  To this, 
Representative Nadler replied “[i]n other words, we are using the State Department 
Bill for something that has nothing to do with the State Department, because we 
cannot find an honest way under the rules of the House to do this.”133 
Representative Nadler attempted to get the majority to make a “gentleman’s 
commitment” that the rules of the House would be observed and the conference 
committee meetings would be open to the public.134  He sought a pledge from the 
majority that they would carry out an open conference committee meeting.135  And 
the majority’s response?  Representative Gekas equivocated.136  The Chairman of the 
Committee on the Judiciary apparently did not care to comment at all.137 
Representative Nadler offered a motion to instruct the conferees that all 
bankruptcy reform conference committee meetings “be open to the public and to the 
print and electronic media;” and “be held in venues selected to maximize the 
                                                                
130Id. 
131146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9790 (2000). 
132Id.  Representative Boucher later stated that “procedural hurdles in the Senate” 
necessitated the unprecedented State Department bill substitution.  Id. at H9791. 
133146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9790 (2000). 
134146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9792 (2000). 
135146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9793 (2000). 
136146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9792 (2000). 
137146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9793 (2000). 
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capacity for attendance by the public and the media.”138  He was particularly 
concerned because previous iterations of bankruptcy reform had been in secret:  
[I]f we are sending this bill to a conference committee, it should be a real 
conference committee, not the sham, shadow conference . . . we had 2 
years ago, where after a ceremonial opening . . . everything else was done 
in camera . . . .  If the spirit of democratic procedure with a small “d,” . . . 
is to be upheld, then the conference committee ought to be a real 
committee.  There ought to be meetings.  The meetings ought to be held in 
a room with chairs and seats and space for the media . . . as is . . . . 
uniformly the case with the rules of the House for committee meetings.139   
Representative Nadler concluded that “the meetings of the conference committee 
should be in conformance with the normal practices, open meetings, and the bill 
should be a result of open deals openly arrived at, to paraphrase Woodrow 
Wilson.”140 
And how do proponents of the bankruptcy reform debacle justify their secret 
approach?  Expediency.  In regards to the shadow conference, Senator Daschle 
remarked that it “seem[ed] to be the most efficient way of resolving this matter.”141 
VI.  SENATE RULE XXVIII 
Senator Wellstone noted that “[c]onference reports are privileged.  It is very 
difficult for a minority in the Senate to stop a conference report as they can with 
other legislation.  That is why these conference reports are being used in this way, 
and that is why the rules are supposed to restrict their scope.”  He noted that such a 
procedural move has only been possible since 1996, when the Senate changed Rule 
XXVIII which had limited the scope of a conference.  Prior to the repeal of Rule 
XVIII, the Senate had the power to strike extraneous pieces of legislation inserted by 
a conference Committee.  At the time of the repeal, Senator Kennedy argued against 
the change, “[Conference] reports cannot be amended.  So conference committees 
are already very powerful.  But if conference committees are permitted to add 
completely extraneous matters in conference . . . conferees will acquire 
unprecedented power.  They will acquire the power to legislate in a privileged, 
unreviewable fashion on virtually any subject.  They will be able to completely 
bypass the deliberative process of the Senate.”142  
Senator Daschle unsuccessfully attempted to get the prior version of Rule 
XXVIII reinstated in 1999.  At the time, he stated that Rule XXVIII  
is a complete emasculation of the process that the Founding Fathers had 
set up . . . . If you were to write a book on how a bill becomes a law, you 
would need . . . . a comic book because it is hilarious to look at the lengths 
                                                                
138146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9791 (2000). 
139146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9791 (2000). 
140Id. 
141Regular Media Briefing With Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD), FEDERAL 
NEWS SERVICE, April 10, 2000.  
142146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000). 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/3
2001] BANKRUPTCY REFORM 209 
we have gone to thwart and undermine and . . . destroy a process that has 
worked so well for 220 years.143  
Prior to bankruptcy reform, this change was used only three times for appropriations 
bills.144 
Senator Wellstone summed up the bankruptcy “sham conference” as “a complete 
emasculation of the process that the Founding Fathers had set up.”145  The Senator 
added that it was “a complete mockery of the legislative process.  We have taken a 
State Department embassy bill and gutted it.  There is not a word left; there is only a 
number.  Instead, you had a bankruptcy bill put in, completely unrelated . . . without 
the deliberation, without the debate, without the ability to offer an amendment.  This 
is not the way we legislate.  This is the Senate at its very worst.”146  Senator 
Wellstone also warned that Congress may be on “the road toward a virtual tricameral 
legislature – House, Senate, and conference committee.”147  And while the House and 
Senate have the constitutional power to amend legislation passed by the other house, 
“measures adopted by the all-powerful conference committee are not amendable.”148  
Senator Feinstein concluded that “[t]he bankruptcy Conference Report . . . is a case 
study of how not to govern.  There was no conference; this report emerged as the 
product of negotiations held exclusively between House and Senate Republicans.”149   
VII.  A LEGISLATURE’S DUTY TO EXPLAIN 
Some commentators assert that legislatures have a normative duty to explain to 
the public the statutes they enact.150  The duty to explain legislation stems from the 
respect Congress owes to the public.151  A legislature that enacts legislation without 
explaining its actions “asserts superiority over and lack of accountability to the 
citizenry.”152  Such a legislature effectively issues an unexplained mandate to 
command its citizens.153  This denies basic human dignity.154  In the words of 
Professor Laurence Tribe, “[L]aws, unlike naked commands must be understandable 
                                                                
143Id. (statement of Senator Wellstone, quoting 145 CONG. REC. S9199-01, S9207 (1999) 
(statement of Senator Daschle)). 
144146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000). 
145146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000). 
146146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11691 (2000). 
147146 CONG. REC.  S11683, S11687 (2000). 
148Id. 
149146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11727 (2000). 
150Bell, supra note 7, at 9-10. 
151Id. at 9.  Commentators also argue that the First Amendment gives citizens a right to 
access information about legislative debate.  Id. at 15.  See infra note 326, at 71. 
152Bell, supra note 7, at 11. 
153Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
297, 348, 353 (1982). 
154Id. 
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. . . [A] citizen whose basic liberty is subject to control is always entitled to some 
answer.”155  Ultimately, a clandestine legislative process is inconsistent with the 
Founders’ notion of a government which “derives all its powers directly or indirectly 
from the great body of the people . . . .”156  
Commentators also argue that there is a “right to be told why,”157  that “other 
people are entitled to be treated as autonomous and free beings rather than as 
manipulable things,”158 and that this is “a commitment that has informed . . . . the 
entire Western liberal tradition.”159  This includes a right not to be misled by the 
legislature.  When a legislature does its work in secret, it is difficult for the public to 
monitor the legislature’s work.160  If citizens are unaware of the reasons for 
legislative enactments, they cannot effectively lobby the legislature.  Nor can they 
exercise their constitutional right to petition the legislature.161  Citizens subjected to a 
legislature that deliberates in secret are also unable to judge the accuracy of 
assumptions underlying legislative decisions.162   
Professor Martha I. Morgan makes a strong case for a requirement that 
legislatures explain the reasons for their laws.  She states that “[i]f voters are to make 
informed judgments concerning governmental decisions they must know why 
decisions have been reached.”163  In short, “[e]ffective self-government is dependent 
upon a well informed public.”164  Here, where the public cannot watch the 
bankruptcy laws being made profound questions arise about the legitimacy of the 
law.  Since the legitimacy of a policy rests upon the consent of the governed, 
“excessive or questionable efforts by government to manufacture consent of the 
governed call the legitimacy of its action into question.”165  In short, “the democratic 
character of any particular statute lies in the deliberative process it must undergo 
before becoming law.  To deny any effectiveness to the process of deliberation is to 
deny that law’s democratic nature.”166  A Congress that skips the deliberation, 
debate, and reports typically found in legislative history is a Congress that shirks its 
                                                                
155Bell, supra note 7, at n.52, quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 302 (1975). 
156THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
157Bell, supra note 7, at 18, quoting Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
503 (2d ed. 1988). 
158Bell, supra note 7, at 19, quoting Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, 
DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 12-13 (1973). 
159Id. 
160Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: “The Illusion of Certainty,” 46 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1723, 1740 (1995).  
161Bell, supra note 7, at 21. 
162Morgan, supra note 153, at 348. 
163Id. at 316. 
164Id. at 349. 
165Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985); Bell, supra note 7, at n.61. 
166Slade, supra note 9, at 190. 
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constitutional responsibility and dodges its democratic duty.  “[D]emocracy in this 
republic lies in the details, the extensive process an idea must undergo before it 
becomes law - - to the extent a statute is democratic, it is only so because of the 
processes necessary to produce it.”167 
The Federalist Papers demonstrate that the Framers designed Congress to 
“preclude agreement on unprincipled, expedient statutes and allow the enactment of 
only well-considered statutes designed to further the public good.”168  The Framers 
intended for legislative debate and compromise to act as safeguards of minority 
rights.169  Thus, the Framers designed the American legislative process to be a 
process of “mediation, compromise, and reconciliation of differing views and 
opinions.”170  The Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements were 
designed to facilitate reasoned and deliberate decision making.171  Furthermore, the 
Senate was especially designed to facilitate reasoned, deliberate legislation.172  
Overall, the Framers intended for Congress to “refine and enlarge the public views, 
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom 
may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of 
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”173  
Underlying these considerations was the Founders’ central concern with the problem 
of factions.174  Controlling the special-interest powers of factions is a “dominant 
theme” of the Federalist Papers.175  As Madison stated in The Federalist, “[A]mong 
the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be 
more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of 
faction.”176  
Professor Bernard W. Bell argues that courts should view the enactions of 
legislatures and legislative history as the action of an institution.177  But for an action 
                                                                
167Id. at 190 (footnote omitted). 
168Bell, supra note 7, at 37.  See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 156, at Nos. 10, 51 (James 
Madison).  
169Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 535 n.30 (1994). 
170Id. at n.30, quoting James J. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group 
Legislation:  Postscript to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881, 902 (1970).  
171Bell, supra note 7, at n.130. 
172Id.  
173THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, supra note 156, at 82 (James Madison).  Although Madison 
recognized the risk that “[m]en of factious tempers . . . may, by intrigue . . . betray the interests 
of the people.”  Id.  Madison even recognized that such a faction could arise with respect to 
bankruptcy:  “Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the 
creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other.”  Id. 
174Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV 223, 223 (1986); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups In American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 40-44 (1985). 
175Macey, supra note 174, at 243-44. 
176THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 156, at 77 (James Madison). 
177Bell, supra note 7, at 79. 
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to be credited to the institution of Congress, it should be made known to all members 
of Congress.178  Some commentators even assert that a legislature’s role in 
publicizing government activities is more important than its legislative role.179  In the 
words of James Madison, “the right of freely examining public characters and 
measures, and of communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every 
other right . . . .”180  Madison’s statement is echoed by the dissent in Capital Cities 
Media, Inc. v. Chester, which warned that granting Congress unfettered discretion to  
decide for us what we need to know . . . . carries with it the seeds of 
destruction of participatory democracy, for it places in the hands of those 
chosen for positions of authority the power to withhold from those to 
whom they should be accountable the very information upon which 
informed voting should be based.181 
VIII.  “THE PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW!”182 
Many modern commentators including Alexander Meiklejohn,183 David Mitchell 
Ivester, Martha I. Morgan, Bernard W. Bell, and Woodrow Wilson have observed 
that Americans have a right to know the workings of their government.  This right 
lies in the “basic principle that self government requires the public to be informed of 
the activities of the government.”184  But the origins of the right to know stretch at 
                                                                
178Id.  
179Id. at n.46, citing WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 198 (2d ed. 1885) 
and JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 81-84 (Currin V. 
Shields ed., 1958). 
1804 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 
1787, at 576 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT]. 
181Capital Cities Media Inc., v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1186 (3rd Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J., 
dissenting) .  Judge Gibbons also noted that “[o]ne cannot vote to throw the rascal out until 
informed of rascality.”  Id. at 1186.  See infra notes 323, 405-407, 415, 416, 420, 424 for more 
discussion of Capital Cities.  
182When newspapers undertook organized activities in the 1950’s to crusade for open 
meetings, their rallying cry was “[t]he people have a right to know!” Open Meeting Statutes, 
supra note 5, at 1199.  Another commentator attributes the origin of the term “right to know” 
to Kent Cooper, the Executive Director of the Associated Press in 1945.  Eugene Cerruti, 
“Dancing in the Courthouse”:  The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 
U. RICH. L. REV. 237 n.1 (1995). 
183ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 
(1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 95-96 (1948); David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 109 n.51 (1977).  Meiklejohn’s writings have been “enormously influential” upon 
the Supreme Court.  Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d at 1183 n.6. (Gibbons, J., 
dissenting) (listing thirteen Supreme Court opinions which referer to Meiklejohn). 
184Michael F. DiMario, Remarks Before the Conference on Government Information 
Issues in the 21st Century on the Foundations of Federal Public Access Policy (Sept. 17, 
1999), in ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES, NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSITORY LIBRARY 
PROGRAM Vol. 20, no. 17 (1999). 
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least as far back as 1644.185  John Milton, in his Areopagitica, argued against 
Parliament’s licensing of the press.186  One of the issues in the English struggle over 
a free press was the freedom to publish parliamentary debates.187  During that era, 
“the argument was repeatedly made that people need to know and have a right to 
know about the affairs of government.”188  
Ivester posits that the right to know is an independent constitutional right.189  This 
right is implicit in the structure of our system of self governance.190  “The sovereign 
people, by virtue of their station as the fundamental source of all governmental 
power, have an inherent right to know what their government is doing.”191  Ivester 
reasons that “[a]lthough pure democracy and an absolutely free flow of information 
are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, the practical relationship between the two 
nevertheless remains unchanged.  To the extent that a system shares responsibility 
for decisionmaking, information must also be shared.”192  A government which 
shares no information with its populace is authoritarian, contrary to the American 
tradition of self governance.193  Self governance is impossible if the people have 
inadequate knowledge of their government’s actions.194  
Ivester convincingly demonstrates that the Founders viewed the right to know as 
fundamentally necessary to our structure of self government.195  “[I]f the people are 
to function as a rational electorate, they must have adequate knowledge of what the 
government is doing.”196  However, critics of the right to know argue that there is no 
constitutional right to know since it is not explicitly spelled out by the 
Constitution.197  This argument fails for two reasons.  First, American jurisprudence 
                                                                
185DiMario states the origins of the right to know stem as far back as Johann Gutenberg’s 
development of movable type in 1455.  Id.  Movable type also fostered the concept of public 
access to government information.  Id.   
186Ivester, supra note 183, at 125, citing J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE 
LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), in PRIMER OF 
INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 169 (H. Jones ed., 1949). 
187Ivester, supra note 183, at 125. 
188Id. 
189Id. at 109. 
190Id. 
191Id. at n.34, citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-41 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); Branzburg v. Hayes 408 U.S. 665, 713-15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (further 
citations omitted). 
192Ivester, supra note 183, at 109. 
193Id. 
194Id. at 115. 
195Id. at 116. 
196Id. at 115 (citation omitted.). 
197David M. O’Brien, The First Amendment and the Public’s “Right to Know,” 7 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 581, 588, 607 (1980); Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an 
Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 501 (1980). 
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and society recognize many rights that are not specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution.  The right to privacy and the right to travel are but two examples.198  
And of course, the Constitution was enacted with the understanding that it was a 
limit on government power, and not an exhaustive list of people’s rights.199  
Second, it would be absurd if the Constitution granted Congress the power to 
withhold information “needed for a responsible exercise of the franchise.”200  After 
all, “[n]othing could be more irrational than to give the people power, and to 
withhold from them information without which power may be abused.”201  Under this 
view, the First Amendment “is not the guardian of mere ‘talkativeness,’ its aim is to 
‘prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens’.”202  Ivester 
cautions that there is not enough direct evidence to conclusively show that the 
people’s right to know about governmental action was the purpose behind the First 
Amendment.203  However, evidence of political thought at the time shows “the 
fundamental need for public information about governmental affairs was widely 
perceived” in England and America.204  In fact, resentment of legislative secrecy 
“played a role in fanning the revolutionary flames that swept the colonies.”205 
In short, the inherent constitutional importance of a right to know is demonstrated 
by many statements made by the Founders and related persons before, during, and 
after the formation of our Constitution and Bill of Rights.   
                                                                
198Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968) (right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1964) (right to privacy).  See Ivester,  supra note 183, at n.51.  This raises the 
possibility that the Court could - and should - make an explicit recognition of the people’s 
right to know the workings (and schemings ) of their Congress.  The increase in amount and 
speed of media today (C- SPAN, the internet, etc.) suggest that this argument is even more 
compelling. 
199Ivester makes this point. Ivester, supra note 183, at n.99 (quoting Hennings, 
Constitutional Law: The People’s Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667, 668 (1959) (“like many 
other fundamental rights, it was taken so much for granted that it was deemed unnecessary to 
include it.”)).  And as Alexander Hamilton wrote in THE FEDERALIST, a bill of rights would 
“contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a 
colorable pretext to claim more than were granted . . . .  Why, for instance, should it be said 
that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which 
restrictions may be imposed?”  THE FEDERALIST, supra, note 148, at  No. 84, at 241 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
200Ivester, supra note 183, at 117, quoting Parks, The Open Government Principle: 
Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 n.14 (1957).  
201Ivester, supra note 183,  at 117 (citations omitted). 
202Id. at 118 (citations omitted). 
203Id. at 124. 
204Id. at 124-25.  This is also evidenced by the fact that eighteenth century press in both 
the colonies and Great Britain defied government bans on reporting the debates of governing 
bodies. Teresa Dale Pupillo, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in 
the 1990’s - An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165 n.10 (1993). 
205Watkins, supra note 47, at 271. 
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IX.  STATEMENTS BY THE FOUNDERS SUPPORTING THE RIGHT TO KNOW 
Among the noted figures who have spoken and written on the importance of the 
public’s right to know about governmental affairs are Benjamin Franklin, Thomas 
Jefferson, John Adams, Patrick Henry, John Marshall, James Wilson, and James 
Madison. 
Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1722 that “[g]overnment . . . the Trustees of the 
People . . . for whose Sake alone all publick Matters are . . . transacted, [must] see 
whether they be well or ill transacted; so it is the Interest, and ought to be the 
Ambition, of all honest Magistrates, to have their Deeds openly examined, and 
publickly scan’d.”206  Franklin also wrote that, if freedom of the press meant “the 
Liberty of discussing the Propriety of Public Measures and political opinions, let us 
have as much of it as you please . . . .”207 
In 1734 Andrew Bradford wrote that freedom of the press means “a Liberty of 
detecting the wicked and destructive Measures of certain Politicians; of dragging 
Villany out of it’s [sic] obscure lurking Holes, and exposing it in it’s [sic] full 
Deformity to Open Day; of attacking Wickedness in high Places . . . .”208 
In 1747, when the governor of New York attempted to prevent publication of the 
legislature’s complaint over the appropriation of funds, New York’s legislature 
unanimously voted that “it is the undoubted Right of the People of this Colony, to 
know the Proceedings of their Representatives . . .   That any Attempt to prohibit the 
printing . . . any of the Proceedings of this House, is a infringement of the Privileges 
of this House and of the People they represent . . . .”209  Several state constitutions 
and conventions also demonstrate support for the right to know about public 
affairs.210  The right to know was also recognized in practice.  The first instance of a 
legislature’s voting record being officially published in the press occurred with the 
publication of the division list of the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 
1726.211  By the 1760’s both the Massachusetts and Virginia assemblies had 
established public galleries.212 
                                                                
206Ivester, supra note 183, at 120 (citations omitted) (Franklin used the term “Magistrates” 
to mean public civil officers, not solely judges.) 
207Id. at n.82 (citations omitted). 
208Ivester, supra note 183, at n.80, quoting THE AMERICAN WEEKLY MERCURY, Apr. 25, 
1734 (further citations omitted). 
209Ivester, supra note 183, at n.80, quoting 2 JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NEW 
YORK, 193 (further citations omitted). 
210Ivester, supra note 183, at 129-30.  Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution stated “The 
printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of 
the legislature.”  Id. at 130 (citations omitted).  In 1788, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
that this clause gives “to every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of those who are 
intrusted with the public business”  Id. at 130. 
211Eugene F. Miller, From Politics of Trust to Politics of Vigilance, 19 GA. L. REV. 781, 
787(1985) (reviewing J.R. POLE, THE GIFT OF GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM 
THE ENGLISH RESTORATION TO AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (1983)); Pole, supra note 203, at 
121, 151-2. 
212Miller, supra note 211, at 787; Pole supra note 203, at 130. 
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After Shay’s rebellion, Thomas Jefferson wrote,  
[T]he way to prevent these [errors] of the people is to give them full 
information of their affairs thro’ . . . public papers, and to contrive that 
those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people.  The basis of 
our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object 
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we 
should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a 
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.213   
In another letter in 1804, Jefferson observed, 
[N]o experiment can be more interesting than that we are now trying, and 
which we trust will end in establishing the fact that man may be governed 
by reason and truth.  Our first object should be to leave open to him all the 
avenues to truth.  The most effectual hitherto found, is the freedom of the 
press.  It is therefore, the first shut up by those who fear the investigation 
of their actions.214 
Correspondence between Chief Justice William Cushing of Massachusetts and 
John Adams also evinces a belief in the right to know about government’s workings.  
In response to the traditional Blackstonian notion that freedom of the press is solely a 
freedom from prior restraints, Cushing warned of the tyrannical consequences “if all 
men are restrained by the fear of jails, scourges and loss of ears from examining the 
conduct of persons in administration.”215  Cushing added that “it cannot be denied” 
that “liberty of the press” must include “a free scanning of the conduct of 
administration and shewing the tendency of it.”216 
In response Adams wrote “Senators are annually eligible by the people.  How are 
their characters and conduct to be known to their constituents but by the press?  If 
the press is to be stopped and the people kept in Ignorance we had much better have 
the first magistrate and Senators hereditary.”217 
Further support for the right to know is demonstrated by the circumstances 
surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts.  The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were 
enacted when the United States was on the verge of war with France, and “ideas and 
rumors of French plots and espionage were sweeping the country.”218  Among other 
things, the Acts outlawed malicious writings against the government.  In response to 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, James Madison - the drafter of the First Amendment - 
drafted the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, which were passed by Virginia’s General 
                                                                
213Ivester, supra note 183, at 120, quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward 
Carrington Jan. 16, 1787, in 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49 (Boyd ed., 1955).  
214Ivester, supra note 183, at n.59, quoting THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 576 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds., 1944). 
215Ivester, supra note 183, at n.61, quoting Letters of William Cushing and John Adams, 
27 MASS L.Q. 12-16 (Oct. 1942), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO 
JEFFERSON 147-153 (L. Levy ed., 1966). 
216Id. 
217Id. 
218Ivester, supra note 183, at n.63. 
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Assembly.  Madison observed the acts ought to “produce universal alarm” because 
the acts were “leveled against the right of freely examining public characters and 
measures[] . . . which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of 
every other right.”219 
John Nicholas of Virginia had warned that if the Alien and Sedition Acts were to 
pass, “the people will be deprived of that information on public measures which they 
have a right to receive, and which is the life and support of a free government 
. . . .”
220
  Even supporters of the Alien and Sedition Acts acknowledged that “in 
Governments like ours, where all political power is derived from the people, and 
whose foundations are laid in public opinion it is essential that the people be truly 
informed of the proceedings, the motives, and views of their constituted 
authorities.”221  In sum, since the 1700’s there has been a “long history of public 
opposition to and distrust of a government that operates behind closed doors.”222 
To be sure, the Founders acknowledged that not every aspect of government 
could be in the open.  In regards to legislative secrecy, Madison stated “[T]here was 
never any legislative assembly without a discretionary power of concealing 
important transactions, the publication of which might be detrimental to the 
community.”223  However, proponents of the secrecy surrounding the bankruptcy bill 
have failed to explain how an open process for bankruptcy legislation would be 
“detrimental to the community.”  The only thing that openness is detrimental to here 
is the ability of special interests to push legislation through at the community’s 
expense. 
X.  THE JOURNAL CLAUSE 
The clandestine congressional conduct in efforts to legislate bankruptcy reform 
raises constitutional concerns.  Does a secret conference committee violate the 
publication requirements of the Constitution’s Journal Clause?  The Journal Clause 
of the Constitution states: 
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings; and from time to 
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment 
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House 
                                                                
219Ivester, supra note 183, at 122, citing 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528-29 (J. Elliot ed. 1901).  Madison also 
stated that “the right of electing the members of the government constitutes more particularly 
the essence of a free and responsible government.  The value and efficacy of this right depends 
on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, 
and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and 
demerits of the candidates respectively.”  ELLIOT, supra note 172, at 575. 
220Ivester, supra note 183, at 123, citing 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 2140 (1798) 
221Ivester, supra note 183, at 124, citing 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 930-931 (Mr. Rutledge). 
222Pupillo, supra note 204, at n.10. 
223Ivester, supra note 183, at n.93 (citations omitted). 
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on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be 
entered on the Journal.224  
What is the meaning of “excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require 
Secrecy[?]”225  Does the Journal Clause grant Congress unfettered discretion as to 
what legislation and deliberation “require Secrecy[?]”  Unfortunately, the Journal 
Clause is relatively obscure, and neither courts nor commentators have written much 
about it.226  So a definitive answer to the above questions cannot be found in case 
law.  However, it is clear that the process of secret conference committees for 
bankruptcy reform violated the Founders’ intentions as manifested in the Journal 
Clause. 
Although on its face the Journal Clause appears to leave the decision as to what 
“Parts” of the journal “require Secrecy” wholly up to congressional “Judgment,” it is 
clear that the Founders did not intend for Congress to arbitrarily conceal important 
aspects of its proceedings from public view.  The wording of the Journal Clause must 
be viewed in its context.  The Journal Clause could have been enacted with different 
wording, and it underwent several iterations at the Constitutional Convention before 
reaching its final form.227  In an earlier version proposed by James Madison and John 
Rutledge the Journal Clause would have read: 
Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and shall, from time to 
time, publish the same, except such parts of the proceedings of the Senate, 
when not acting in its legislative capacity, as may be judged by that house 
to require secrecy;228 
Had this early version of the Journal Clause been enacted, Congress’s obligation 
to publish its legislative proceedings would be beyond dispute.  However, nearly 
every state at the Convention objected vigorously to the phrase “when not acting in 
                                                                
224U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.  The Journal is also addressed in article  I, § 7, clause 2 of 
the Constitution, which provides that when the president vetoes a bill, Congress must enter the 
president’s objections on the Journal; and that the names of persons voting for and against 
override of a veto must be recorded on the Journals. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  See Prevost 
v. Morgenthau, 106 F.2d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1939).  In addition to the Journal Clause, the 
Framers’ desire that the people be informed about their government’s workings is reflected in 
Article I, Section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution, which provides that “a regular Statement and 
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to 
time.” U.S. Const. art I § 9, cl. 7.  See Capital Cities Media Inc., v. Chester, 797 F.2d at 1168 
(Gibbons, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution states that the 
President “shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union 
. . . .” U.S. Const art. II § 3. 
225U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.  
226Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena 
for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C.L.REV. 879 n.85 (1985).  The Journal Clause is also referred to as 
the publication clause.  Id. at n.85.  
227ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 238-399; See also MAX FARRAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 257-60 (Yale University Press 1966) (1911) [hereinafter 
“FARRAND”]. 
228JEFFREY ST. JOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL JOURNAL 154 (1987); See also ELLIOT, supra note 
180, at 238 (emphasis added). 
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its legislative capacity.”229  Their objections were based on the concern that the 
phrase might grant the Senate the power to act in a capacity outside of its legislative 
role.230  Consequently, the phrase “when not acting in its legislative capacity,” was 
replaced by the phrase “except such parts thereof in [the Senate’s] Judgment require 
secrecy .  .  .  .”231  Despite this change in wording, there was unanimous agreement 
that each House must keep a journal of its legislative proceedings and publish it from 
time to time.232   
Moreover, examination of the constitutional debates surrounding the Journal 
Clause makes it clear that the “Judgment” phrase in the Journal Clause was intended 
only to allow Congress to keep confidential work related to diplomacy, military 
preparations, and war.233  Thus, “the Framers intended to create only a narrow band 
of confidentiality to protect against the disclosure of military and diplomatic 
secrets.”234  This echoes the Articles of Confederation, which required monthly 
publication of the proceedings of the Continental Congress yet contained an 
exception for treaties, alliances, and military operations.235  
                                                                
229ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154. 
230FARRAND, supra note 227, at 259; ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154. 
231FARRAND, supra note 227, at 257; ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154. This substitution 
only passed by a “narrow 6 to 4 vote with one State divided.”  Id., citing FARRAND, supra note 
227, at 260  (Yet Elliot states that the delegates struck the phrase “when it shall be acting in its 
legislative capacity[,]” and instead inserted the phrase “except such parts thereof as, in their 
judgment, require secrecy.”  ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 238. Perhaps Elliot neglected to 
include the word “not[.]”)  Several other proposals to alter the Clause failed.  A proposal 
which would have required only the House to keep a Journal, while allowing dissenting 
members of the Senate to record dissents, failed. ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 238.  
232ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154, citing FARRAND, supra note 227, at 260. 
233ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 72 (“Mr. Steele observed . . .  the necessity of publishing 
their transactions was an excellent check, and that every principle of prudence and good policy 
pointed out the necessity of not publishing transactions as related to military arrangements and 
war . . . . Mr. Iredell seconded this, by remarking that ‘in time of war it was absolutely 
necessary to conceal the operations of government; otherwise no attack on an enemy could be 
premeditated with success, for the enemy could discover our plans soon enough to defeat them 
- that it was no less imprudent to divulge our negotiations with foreign powers . . . .’”)  Id. at 
73.  Mr. Perley also cited military considerations as a justification for secrecy, noting that it 
would have been imprudent for General Washington to publish his military strategies ahead of 
time.  Id. at 52. 
234Raveson, supra note 226, at n.85 (emphasis added), citing Kaye, Congressional Papers, 
Judicial Subpoenas and the Constitution, 24 UCLA L. REV. 523 (1977); FARRAND, supra note 
227, at 270.  Although a proposal to amend the clause to specifically make the secrecy 
provisions applicable only to “treaties and military operations” failed.  ELLIOT, supra note 180, 
at 238. 
235ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154, citing CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 430-31 (1937).  Article IX of the Articles of Confederation stated “The 
congress of the united states . . . shall publish the Journal of their proceedings monthly, except 
such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment 
require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each state, or any of them, at his or 
their request shall be furnished with a transcript of the said Journal, except such parts as are 
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In sum, the Founders put the Journal Clause in the Constitution to facilitate the 
“restraints of public opinion[.]”236  The Journal Clause is a literal commitment to 
grant the people the “opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the 
misconduct of the persons they trust.”237  The Journal Clause is a vital aspect of the 
Constitution because it facilitates the “restraints of public opinion[]” upon the 
government.238   
Nonetheless, delegates were concerned that the revised language in the Journal 
Clause granted too much leeway to Congress to work in secret.  Mr. Widgery 
expressed concern that under the phrase “‘except such parts as may require secrecy,’ 
Congress might withhold the whole journals under this pretence and thereby the 
people be kept in ignorance of their doings.”239  Mr. Gorham reassured Mr. Widgery 
that “[t]he printers, no doubt, will be interested to obtain the journals as soon as 
possible for publication, and they will be published in a book, by Congress, at the 
end of every session.”240  Mr. Gorham noted secrecy was sometimes necessary, and 
he provided the example that foreign enemies must not be allowed to learn of the 
Union’s treaty negotiations.241  When Mr. Graham asked for an explanation of the 
words “from time to time,”  Mr. Davie answered that “there could be no doubt of . . . 
[Congress] publishing them as often as it would be convenient and proper, and that 
they would conceal nothing but what it would be unsafe to publish.”242   
In fact, Oliver Ellsworth observed that the Journal Clause was superfluous, since 
“[t]he Legislature will not fail to publish their proceedings from time to time - The 
<people> will call for it if it should be improperly omitted.” (punctuation in the 
original)243  In other words, the Founders presumed that people would have it “within 
their power and ability to monitor and check government secrecy even without an 
express constitutional provision.”244   
Patrick Henry feared the Constitution still would not adequately prevent abuse of 
governmental secrecy: “[t]he liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, 
                                                          
above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several states.”  O’Brien, supra note 189, 
at 591-2, citing 19 THE JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 214 (1912). 
236Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 768, 
757 (2001). 
237Id. at 768-69, quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob 
E. Cooke ed., 1961).  However, other commentators argue that the Journal Clause merely 
emphasizes the accountability of individual legislators.  Bell, supra note 7, at n.86. 
238THE FEDERALIST No. 70 at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961), 
quoted in Fitzgerald, supra note 236, at 768. 
239ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 52 (emphasis in original). 
240Id.  
241Id.  
242Id. at 72 (emphasis added); See also FARRAND, supra note 227, at 345 (emphasis 
added). 
243FARRAND, supra note 227, at 260; Ivester, supra note 183, at 132, citing 5 DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 408 (J. 
Elliot ed., 1901) 
244Ivester, supra note 183, at 132. 
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secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them . . . .”  
Henry understood a legitimate need for secrecy under certain conditions.  “[S]uch 
transactions as relate to military operations . . . I would not wish to be published, till 
the end which required their secrecy should have been effected.  But to cover with 
the veil of secrecy the common routine of business, is an abomination in the eyes of 
every intelligent man, and every friend to his country.”245  Henry criticized the 
Journal Clause for failing to specify both the frequency of journal publication, and 
the circumstances under which journals could be kept secret.246  
Henry also warned that:  
The important right of making treaties is upon the most dangerous 
foundation.  The President, and a few senators, possess it in the most 
unlimited manner, without any real responsibility, if from sinister views, 
they should think proper to abuse it; for they may keep all their measures 
in the most profound secrecy, as long as they please.  Were we not told 
that war was the case wherein secrecy was the most necessary?  But by 
the paper on your table, their secrecy is not limited to this case only.  It is 
as unlimited and unbounded as their powers.  Under the abominable veil 
of political secrecy and contrivance, your most valuable rights may be 
sacrificed by a most corrupt faction, without having the satisfaction of 
knowing who injured you.  They are bound by honor and conscience to 
act with integrity, but they are under no constitutional restraint.247   
Henry added “I do not wish that transactions relative to treaties should, when 
unfinished, be exposed; but it should be known after they were concluded, who had 
advised them to be made, in order to secure some degree of certainty that the public 
interest shall be consulted in their formation.”248 
John Marshall responded to Henry’s fears by reassuring him that in the 
Constitution, “secrecy is only used when it would be fatal and pernicious to publish 
the schemes of government.”249  In fact, “in the most explicit language, one of the 
most influential members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 declared before 
the Convention that the people have a right to know.”250  James Wilson of 
Pennsylvania stated “[T]he people have a right to know what their agents are doing 
or have done, and it should not be in the option of the legislature to conceal their 
proceedings.”251   
                                                                
245Id. at 131, quoting 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 170 (J. Elliot ed., 1901)  
246Ivester, supra note 183, at n.96. 
247ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 315-16. 
248Id. at 316.  
249Ivester, supra note 183, at 131, quoting 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 233 (J. Elliot ed., 1901)  
250Ivester, supra note 183, at 132-33. 
251Ivester, supra note 183, at 132, quoting 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 233, 409 (J. Elliot ed., 1901); 
ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154, citing MAX FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, 260 (1966). 
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To be sure, this did not mean the Founders intended for Congress to make an 
exhaustive detailing of every proceeding.  Mr. J. Galloway indicated that votes did 
not need to be recorded for “trifling occasions.”252  However, Galloway noted that 
there was “no doubt” that votes would be required “on every occasion of 
importance.”253   
Additionally, commentators observe that the Journal Clause imposes a 
congressional duty to explain.254  In the words of Justice Story,  
The object of the whole clause is to insure publicity to the proceedings of 
the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their 
respective constituents.  And it is founded in sound policy and deep 
political foresight.  Intrigue and cabal are thus deprived of some of their 
main resources, by plotting and devising measures in secrecy.  The public 
mind is enlightened by an attentive examination of the public measures; 
patriotism and integrity and wisdom obtain their due reward; and votes are 
ascertained, not by vague conjecture, but by positive facts . . . .  So long as 
known and open responsibility is valuable as a check or an incentive 
among the representatives of a free people, so long a journal of their 
proceedings and their votes, published in the face of the world, will 
continue to enjoy public favor and be demanded by public opinion.255 
In Marshall Field & Co v. Clark, the appellants contested the validity of a 
statute.256  They alleged that an entire section of the enacted statute was not contained 
in the form of the bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the 
respective houses of Congress.257  The pertinent issue was to determine “the nature of 
the evidence upon which a court may act when the issue is made as to whether a bill 
. . . was or was not passed by Congress.”258  Quoting Justice Story, the Court held 
that the purpose of the Journal Clause is to foster publicity, facilitate the public 
development of public opinion, act as a check upon intrigue, and prevent the secret 
plotting of measures.259   
However, the Court held that the Journal Clause does not place specific 
requirements upon Congress in terms of the “particular mode” Congress must 
employ to record those proceedings not expressly required to be entered on the 
                                                                
252ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 73. 
253Id.  
254Bell, supra note 7, at n.86, citing Murial Morrisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: 
Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 588 n.14, 598 (1994). 
2552 Story, CONST. §§ 840, 841, quoted in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670-71 (1892).  
256Clark, 143 U.S. at 669. 
257Id. at 669. 
258Id. at 670. 
259Id. at 670-71. 
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Journals.260 Consequently, the level of detail required in the journals is “left to the 
discretion of the respective houses of Congress.”261   
The Court noted that there are “certain matters [that] the Constitution expressly 
requires that they shall be entered on the journal.”262  Yet the Court then stated that 
“[t]o what extent the validity of legislative action may be affected by the failure to 
have those matters entered on the journal we need not inquire.”263  So the Court 
dodged an examination of what the “certain matters” are that the “Constitution 
expressly requires . . . shall be entered on the journal.”  The ambiguity of Marshall 
Field’s holding illustrates that a secret conference committee proceeding would 
probably not be actionable as a matter of black letter law.  Nonetheless, it is clear 
that the “secret plotting of measures” violates the spirit of the Journal Clause.  The 
Framers would likely be astonished to see Congress covering bankruptcy reform 
with Henry’s “veil of secrecy.” 
A critic of this article might argue that secret congressional committees are not 
fundamentally problematic since the final votes of members of Congress on a bill are 
recorded.  This is not a new argument.  In 1738, when members of the House of 
Commons made a last effort to resist the publication of Parliamentary deliberations, 
Sir William Wyndham argued to his fellow members that the people “have a right to 
know somewhat more of the proceedings of this House than what appears upon your 
votes . . . .”264  Wyndham noted that a people’s knowledge beyond just a plain voting 
record “is so necessary for their being able to judge of the merits of their 
representatives within doors.”265  To be fully informed about their elected officials, 
the people must have more knowledge than a plain list of votes.  To understand 
government institutions and to supervise the proceedings, people must be able to 
actually witness those proceedings.266  So too the American people must be able to 
observe congressional deliberation.267  Merely permitting the people to see a cold 
transcript of what transpired in Congress is not enough.268  As Chief Justice Warren 
Burger wrote, “[P]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their 
                                                                
260Clark, 143 U.S. at 671. 
261Id.  See U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n.4 (1990). 
262Clark, 143 U.S. at 671. 
263Id.  The Court has not expanded Marshall Field beyond its holding, and has pointed out 
that Field does not apply when another provision of the constitution is implicated.  Munoz-
Flores, 495 U.S. 385, at n.4.  
264Ivester, supra note 183, at n.73, citing 10 W. COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 803 
(1812) (further citations omitted). 
265Id. 
266Cohn, supra note 3, at 399. 
267Or the press, acting as the agent of the American people.  The press acts as an “agent” 
for the public, and provides the public with “information needed for the intelligent discharge 
of . . . political responsibilities.”  Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974); 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 584, n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (1980). 
268Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that 
availability of a trial transcript is no substitute for public presence at the trial itself). 
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institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from 
observing.”269  
XI.  SECRECY IN THE EARLY CONGRESS - AND TODAY 
An examination of openness in Congress shows that Patrick Henry’s criticism of 
the Journal Clause was unfortunately prophetic.  While the House of Representatives 
has met in public since its inception,270 the same is not true of the Senate.  For the 
first few years of its existence, the Senate had an informal “closed-door policy.”271  
                                                                
269Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572, quoted in Cohn, supra note 3, at 399. 
270Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1203; Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press 
Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927 n.46 (1992), citing Frank Thayer, 
LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS 33 (1944).  But see Watkins, supra note 47, at n.16 (stating the 
initial House sessions were attended by reporters in 1789, but that secrecy fell upon the House 
by 1792). 
271Cohn, supra note 3, at 370-71.  Readers with a knowledge of history will no doubt point 
out that secrecy in deliberation occurred prior to the establishment of Congress.  During the 
Sixteenth and early Seventeenth centuries, the proceedings of the House of Commons were 
generally kept secret.  Pole, supra note 211, at 89.  Only the outcomes of the proceedings, in 
the form of laws were officially made known to the public.  Id. at 89.  The House of Commons 
implemented this secrecy policy largely to check the power of the crown.  Id. at 90, 95, 141; 
Watkins, supra note 47, at 271.  Furthermore the House of Commons generally operated under 
a fiction of unity, under which the entire House symbolically agreed upon the passage of a bill. 
Pole, supra note 211, at 100. 
Nonetheless, upon their return home, House members often made reports of Parliamentary 
occurrences to their electors.  Id. at 97-98, 104.  Moreover, the ostensible rule of secrecy was 
frequently departed from.  Id. at 113-15.  By the 1730’s official written accounts of the 
occurrences in Parliament sold at rate of two thousand copies a day.  Id. at 105.  By 1780, 
Parliament was almost uniformly open to the public.  Id. at 113. 
In seventeenth century colonial America, assemblies resisted publishing their proceedings. 
Pole, supra note 211, at 119.  Like Parliament, colonial assemblies feared interference by the 
crown.  Id. at 119.  But by the 1730’s, division lists were published in the colonial press.  Id. at 
121, 124, 128.  By the time of the Revolution, “the old principle of legislative privacy began 
to crumble.  It was tainted with the same odor as toryism, aristocracy, and oligarchy.”  Id. at 
131. 
After the Revolution, state constitutions uniformly provided that legislative journals would 
be open to the public, and it became customary to admit the public to legislative debates.  Id. 
at 131.  Despite this, the Continental Congress proceeded to meet in secret.  Pole, supra note 
211, at 132.  The Continental Congress implemented its policy of secrecy because it did not 
wish to appear divided and also because it had to negotiate with foreign powers.  Id. at 132.  
Yet this secrecy aroused great suspicion and “destroyed much of the respect” in which the 
Continental Congress had been held.  Id. at 132.  
At the Constitutional Convention, the press was barred from entry and delegates were 
enjoined from revealing proceedings to the press.  Dyk, supra note 270, at 931; Nixon v. 
Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 n.11 (1977).  Yet the secrecy of the Constitutional 
Convention must be put into context.  The Convention was only years after the Revolution, the 
“times that try men’s souls.” THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, THE AMERICAN CRISIS I (1776), 
reprinted in THOMAS PAINE, COLLECTED WRITINGS 91-99 (Eric Foner ed., 1995); see R. B. 
Bernstein, Rediscovering Thomas Paine, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 873, 883 (1994).  The 
Founders feared that “publication of the Convention debates would provide opponents in the 
States ammunition to shoot down ratification of the proposed constitution.”  ST. JOHN, supra 
note 228, at 155, 200. 
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This is not to say that all proceedings of the early Senate were secret.  The Senate’s 
first rules mentioned neither secrecy nor closed doors.272  However, the Senate 
adopted resolutions to make proceedings secret.273  Senators viewed themselves as an 
aristocracy, as they were not popularly elected.274  The Federalist Party, taking an 
elitist view, preferred to conduct proceedings in secret.275  On the other hand, the 
populist Republicans desired open sessions.276   
The lack of public deliberation by the early Senate led to a great deal of 
resentment.277  When the Senate approved the Jay Treaty in executive session in 
1794, “the public outcry was deafening.”278  In fact, Senatorial secrecy was the most 
                                                          
Furthermore, not all the Founders were in favor of the secrecy policy.  Thomas Jefferson 
wrote, “I am sorry that they began their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of 
tying up the tongues of their members.  Nothing can justify this example but the innocence of 
their intentions & ignorance of the value of public discussions.”  Id. at  19-20, 140.  Benjamin 
Franklin also disapproved of the secrecy policy (and he required a delegate at his elbow when 
in public to remind him of the secrecy requirement).  Id. at 19.  James Wilson disliked the 
secrecy policy, and Luther Martin was “furious” about it.  Id. at 20, 130.  The press also 
complained of the secrecy policy.  Id. at 37.  Nor was the secrecy policy scrupulously 
observed.  Leaks occurred to some extent.  ST. JOHN, supra note 220, at 118-19, 129, 132.  
Secrecy combined with leaks resulted in a public that was often profoundly misinformed as to 
the state of the Convention.  Id. at 87, 93, 158-59.  This included circulation of the rumor that 
the delegates planned to make King George’s son an elected monarch.  Id. at 132-33. 
Moreover, commentators argue that the secrecy of the Constitutional Convention is “quite 
irrelevant” because the Journal Clause of the Constitution provides for only limited 
congressional secrecy.  RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 206 
(Harvard U. Press, 1974), quoted in Viet D. Dinh, Book Review, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 346, 
349 (1996).  In short, during the Constitutional Convention the need for press access to 
Congress was asserted, those claims were taken seriously, and the Framers viewed them as a 
relevant concern.  Dyk, supra note 270, at 933-34.   
272Cohn, supra note 3, at 371. 
273Id. 
274Id. 
275Id. at 370.  Members of the Federalist party took the elitist view that Congress was 
“supposed to discuss, decide, and speak for people[.]” James P. Martin, When Repression is 
Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act 
of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 132 (1999).  According to Martin, the Federalists saw 
congressional deliberation to be public “not in the sense of the village commons, open to all, 
but of a military base.  The people own it but this does not mean individuals can traverse it at 
will.”  Id. at 138.  But even the most elitist of the Federalists would likely be appalled to see 
the intense lobbying carried out to push bankruptcy reform.  The Federalist party intended for 
Congress to be immune from the influence of organized factions, a Congress “set totally above 
the influence of a surrounding populace.”  Id. at 143 (citation omitted).  The Federalist party 
did not intend for congressional deliberation to be taken over by “small minorities of active 
but unrepresentative citizens.”  Id. at 182.   
276Cohn, supra note 3, at 370. 
277Id. at 371; Pole, supra note 211, at 138 (describing early Senate secrecy as “regressive” 
in the face of the American people’s established interest in knowing the workings of their 
legislature). 
278Cohn, supra note 3, at 373. 
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criticized aspect of the Senate in its first five years.279  Critics accused the Senate of 
creating plots behind closed doors.280  Philip Freneau, editor of the National Gazette, 
launched a campaign to open the Senate’s sessions.281  Freneau observed that 
“shutting the doors of the legislature upon the people and excluding private citizens 
from their tables [was] dangerous to liberty and entirely inconsistent with the 
principle of a free government.”282  Freneau exclaimed “[A]re you freemen who 
ought to know the individual conduct of your legislators, or [are] you an inferior 
order of beings incapable of comprehending the sublimity of Senatorial functions, 
and unworthy to be entrusted with their opinions?”283  
This increasing suspicion of Senate secrecy led the Senate to construct a public 
gallery in 1795 and to resolve that the galleries be opened every morning, except for 
situations which in the Senate’s opinion required secrecy.284  Thus by the mid-
1790’s, the press actively reported the debates of both houses of Congress.285  In fact, 
the right to know had become “a generally recognized view[,]” from which no 
legislator would admit dissenting.286  The right to know had become “a new 
condition of political legitimacy.”287   
Nonetheless, Senators continued to meet in secret sessions and to hold committee 
meetings in executive session.288  Senators continued to so meet in part because they 
“liked to unbutton their vests, light up cigars and stretch out on the leather couches in 
the Senate chamber” while they debated policy.289  For instance, the Bank of the 
United States was created behind closed doors.290  The clandestine nature of the 
Bank’s creation was criticized.291  
In 1929 secrecy in Senate deliberations led to a leak which resulted in a false 
newspaper headline.292  Reformers argued that open Senate deliberations would 
foster accuracy in press accounts.293  Consequently, the Senate voted in 1929 to 
                                                                
279Id. at 372. 
280Id.  
281Id. at 371. 
282Id. at n.34, quoting Gerald L. Grotta, Philip Freneau’s Crusade for Open Sessions of 
the U.S. Senate, JOURNALISM Q. 670 (Winter 1971). 
283Cohn, supra note 3, at 371, citing Grotta, supra note 282, at 669. 
284Cohn, supra note 3, at 372. 
285Miller, supra note 211, at 785; Pole, supra note 211, at 138-39. 
286Pole, supra note 211, at 140. 
287Id. 
288Cohn, supra note 3, at 373. 
289Id. 
290Id. at n.32. 
291Id. 
292Id. at 375 (referring to inaccurate front page headline from 1929). 
293Id.; see also Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1201 (observing that leaks from 
closed deliberations are often “incomplete and slanted according to the views of the informant.  
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/3
2001] BANKRUPTCY REFORM 227 
reverse the presumption of Senate secrecy.294  All executive sessions were to be 
open, unless the Senate voted specifically to shut the doors.295  From 1929 to 2000, 
the Senate held fifty-three executive sessions with closed doors in which it discussed 
impeachment, and classified and national defense issues.296  As recently as the early 
1960’s, one third of Senate committee meetings were closed.297  However, committee 
sessions have been “routinely open to the public” since the mid-1970’s.298 
Today, it would seem that it is customary that Congress works in the open.  After 
all, C-SPAN 2 has provided live “gavel-to-gavel” coverage of every public Senate 
session since 1986.299  Nonetheless, some recent incidents of congressional secrecy 
have engendered substantial criticism.  These recent incidents demonstrate that the 
secrecy surrounding the bankruptcy reform process is not an aberrant abuse of 
government power.  Among recent examples of congressional secrecy are the 2001 
tax cut, which was negotiated behind closed doors for two days before Congress’s 
Memorial Day recess.300  Negotiations on the 1998 Omnibus Budget Bill were also 
                                                          
To restrict the press to such sources of information is a disservice both to the public, which is 
misled, and to the officials, who may be judged on the basis of these distorted reports.”). 
294Cohn, supra note 3, at 376. 
295Id.  
296Id. 
297Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1204. 
298Watkins, supra note 47, at 272. 
299Cohn, supra note 3, at 402.  Of course, we are aware of the realities of the political 
process.  “One of the problems with the legislative process today is that its results are often . . . 
the result of back-room, under-the-table deals between incumbents and special interests.” 
Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation 
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 984 (1999).  Legislatures commonly act in a deceptive 
manner, such as enacting a statute to protect an industry’s special interest, yet presenting the 
statue as consumer-protection statute.  Bell, supra note 7, at 21 n.64; Macey, supra note 174, 
at 232.  And it is not unheard of for Congress to pass a statute with a scarce or vague 
legislative history.  See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855-47 (1984); Carlin 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 116 n.7 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
305 (1988).  In fact, legislators are often unaware of the contents of a bill they vote for.  See 
George Hager, House Passes Spending Bill; Massive Omnibus Measure Larded With Pet 
Projects, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 21, 1998, at A01 (discussing House members’ ignorance of 
the contents of a massive budget bill weighing forty pounds and quoting Rep. Peter A. 
DeFazio’s observation that “half the members couldn’t even lift it, let alone read it.”).   
Moreover, “[m]ost political maneuvering, legislative negotiation, and compromise takes 
place in circumstances where no official records are kept - at caucuses, leadership meetings 
. . . and private conferences.”  Bell, supra note 7, at n.273.  “Indeed, strategic manipulation of 
rules by crafty legislators may ensure the passage of bills that might otherwise fail.”  Michael 
B. Miller, The Justiciablity of Legislative Rules and the “Political” Political Question 
Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1346 (1990).  But when, as with bankruptcy reform, 
congressional secrecy and manipulation of the rules rise to the level of constitutional import, it 
is not just politics as usual. 
300Cohen, supra note 48. 
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held behind closed doors.301  Nor is the problem of secrecy facilitating the 
questionable insertion of provisions into legislation unique to bankruptcy reform - 
Senator John McCain pointed out that the secrecy on the 1998 budget negotiations 
facilitated the insertion of a 52-page long list of wasteful expenditures, including a 
$750,000 grant for grasshopper research in Alaska.302  Consider also the $50 billion 
tax break for the tobacco industry which was anonymously inserted into revenue 
legislation in 1997.303   
Of course there is also the recurrent Senatorial practice of placing an anonymous 
secret “hold” upon a proposed nominee or action that a Senator disapproves of.  
Despite Senate efforts to end this secret practice,304 the practice continues.305  
Moreover, there is some indication that in the wake of September 11th terrorist 
attacks, security concerns may be improperly used to excuse a reversal of the 
decades-long trend towards open government.306   
The congressional secrecy which has received the most criticism in recent years 
involved the secret Senate debates and closed deliberations during the impeachment 
trial of former President Clinton.307  Senators opposed to secrecy in the impeachment 
                                                                
301John McCain, Editorial, A Budget We Should Be Ashamed Of, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
Oct. 25, 1998, at section 4, 17; Denning & Smith, supra note 299, at 959. 
302McCain, supra note 301; Denning & Smith, supra note 299, at n.18.  See id. at 991 
(criticizing secrecy with which “pork” appropriations are added to bills); Hager, supra note 
291. 
303Senator Russell Feingold, The Supreme Issue: Wisconsin’s Leadership in Government 
Reform, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 823, 826 (1998) (mentioning a $50 billion tax break for the 
tobacco industry anonymously inserted into revenue legislation in 1997).  
304John Breshnahan, Senate Leaders End Secrecy of ‘Holds’, ROLL CALL, March 8, 1999. 
305Helen Dewar, Senate Has a ‘Hold’ on Holbrooke; Policy Fails to Curtail Secret Delay 
Tactic, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 3, 1999, at A05; Leahy’s Office Denies Hold on Walters 
Drug Czar Nomination, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 21, 2001; Joan Flynn, A Quiet 
Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1361, 1440.  When a secret “hold’ is placed, even other senators are often unable to discover 
the identity of the senator who placed the “hold.”  Patry, supra note 73, at 147-48; Anonymous 
Holds Still Slowing Bills in Senate, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 16, 2001. 
306See Michael Y. Park, Where the Sunshine Laws Don’t Shine, FOX NEWS, Nov. 29 2001, 
at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,39672,00.html (discussing reactions of Professors 
Laurence H. Tribe and Samuel Issacharoff to moves towards increased governmental secrecy 
in Florida, Iowa, and New Hampshire); Brendan Farrington, Watchdog Groups Criticize 
Efforts to Close Meetings, Records, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Oct. 27, 
2001 (discussing efforts to change State Senate rules in Florida to allow secret meetings and 
even secret votes); Connie Mabin, Coryn: Lawmakers Should Study Open Records Security 
Exemption, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Dec. 11, 2001 (Texas Attorney 
General recommending the creation of a security exemption to state sunshine laws).   
307Cohn, supra note 3, at 366, 392.  Another example of the abuse of governmental 
secrecy in policy deliberation (albeit not a congressional abuse) involved the secrecy 
surrounding the Clintons’ President’s Task Force on National Health Care Reform.  See 
Assoc. of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 813 F. Supp. 82, 84, 94 (D.D.C. 
1993), rev’d and remanded, 337 U.S. 394 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  The Administration kept the 
workings of the Task Force secret in an attempt to avoid press criticism.  W. John Thomas, 
The Clinton Health Care Reform Plan: A Failed Dramatic Presentation, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
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process argued that the Senate must not act like a private club, and the public had a 
right to see how the Senate reached its decisions.308  Senator Lieberman argued that 
Americans should be able to watch the impeachment trial “end on a note of rational 
and thoughtful debate.”309  There were both Republican and Democrat Senators who 
agreed on the need for public deliberations.310  Senator Arlen Specter stated, “[I]t is 
very important for the American people to understand as fully as possible why we 
are doing what we are doing.”311  
XII.  THE SOCIETAL PURPOSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND  
ACCESS TO CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATION 
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are 
denied acquaintance with information . . . relevant to that issue, just so far 
the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general 
good.  It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community 
against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. The 
principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the 
program of self government.312  
If we view the First Amendment as an American commitment to a framework of 
values, then the First Amendment requires open government.313  As Justice Brennan 
observed, the First Amendment “has a structural role . . . in securing and fostering 
our republican system of self government.”314  In his dissent in Saxbe v. Washington 
Post, Justice Powell wrote at length of the First Amendment’s “societal function . . . 
in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs.”315  He observed that  
“[n]o aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its 
protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider and 
resolve their own destiny.”316  Justice Powell quoted then-Solicitor General Robert 
                                                          
REV. 83, 88 (1995-96).  The Task Force kept the names of its 500-odd members secret; and 
held at least 20 secret meetings and only one quasi-public meeting.  Id. at 89-90.  The secrecy 
of the Task Force’s deliberations was subject to widespread criticism.  Nancy Benac, White 
House to Release Secret Documents of Health Task Force, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 18, 
1994.  Thus, secrecy was instrumental in the collapse of public support for the plan. Thomas, 
supra note 307, at 84. 
308Cohn, supra note 3, at 392, quoting Senator Tom Harkin. 
309Id. at 393. 
310Id. at 394. 
311Id. 
312ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 26 (1948) (emphasis in original), quoted in 
Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 863 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
313David A. Anderson, Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1205, 1217 (1991), 
citing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (Harvard 
University Press, 1990). 
314Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
315417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting.) 
316Id. 
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H. Bork’s observation that “the First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our 
national commitment to intelligent self government.”317  Justice Powell added that 
the First Amendment   
embodies our Nation’s commitment to popular self-determination and our 
abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national policy 
lies in a free exchange of views on public issues.  And public debate must 
not only be unfettered; it must also be informed.  For that reason this 
Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass the 
receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free expression.318   
Justice Powell further stated that “this reasoning . . . underlies our recognition in 
Branzburg that ‘news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections 
. . . .’”
319
  The Justice added that “[b]y enabling the public to assert meaningful 
control over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting 
the societal purpose of the First Amendment.”320  In other words, “these expressly 
guaranteed freedoms “share a ‘common core purpose of assuring freedom of 
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government’.”321 
It is clear that the Framers intended for the First Amendment to act as a check on 
the actions of government officials.  In fact, Patrick Henry argued that one of the 
main reasons necessitating the adoption of a bill of rights was to prevent the abuse of 
governmental secrecy.322  The author of the First Amendment, James Madison, 
repeatedly made statements in Congress indicating that he intended for the First 
Amendment to restrain the abuse of power by public officials.323  Madison contrasted 
Britain’s nearly omnipotent Parliament with Congress:  
In the United States, the case is altogether different.  The people, not 
the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.  The legislature, no less 
than the executive, is under limitations of power.  Encroachments are 
regarded as possible from the one as well as from the other.  Hence, in the 
United States, the great and essential rights of the people are secured 
against legislative as well as executive ambition.  They are secured, not by 
laws paramount to prerogative, but by constitutions paramount to laws.  
This security of the freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt, 
not only from previous restraint of the executive, as in Great Britain but 
from legislative restraint also;  and this exemption, to be effectual must be 
an exemption, not only from the previous inspection of licensers, but from 
                                                                
317Id. 
318417 U.S. at 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting)(citations and footnote omitted). 
319Id. at 863, citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). 
320417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
321Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 517 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
322ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 314-316; see supra note 243 and text. 
323Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1184 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Madison articulated this justification for the speech-press clause in the House of 
Representatives on June 8, 1789, in a House debate in 1794, and again in 1799) (citations 
omitted). 
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the subsequent penalty of laws . . . .  In the United States, the executive 
magistrates are not held to be infallible, nor the legislatures to be 
omnipotent;  and both, being elective, are both responsible.324 
Thomas Jefferson also viewed freedom of the press as putting a “legal check . . . into 
the hands of the Judiciary.”325 
Similarly, many modern commentators have written on the importance of the 
First Amendment in restraining governmental abuses of power.326  They note that by 
providing the public with information pertaining to governmental decisions, the press 
acts as a check on governmental abuse.327  Professor Vincent Blasi is a noted 
proponent of this concept of the First Amendment, which gives each citizen a right to 
hear “all matters relevant to governance.”328  While this may not mean that all 
citizens are personally involved in forming public policy, it does envision citizens 
using their right to vote for officials to veto public policy.329  The “checking” concept 
of the First Amendment has been noted by the Court.  In Grosjean v. American Press 
Co., the Court recognized that the “untrammeled press” is a “vital source” of “public 
information” and stated that “informed public opinion is the most potent of all 
restraints upon misgovernment. . . .”330  In Mills v. Alabama, the Court stated that 
“the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of 
power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping 
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected 
to serve.”331  Moreover, the requirement that a legislator explain her vote facilitates 
                                                                
324James Madison, quoted in Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1184 (Gibbons, J., 
dissenting), citing 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, 569-70 (J. Elliot ed., 1881). 
325Dyk, supra note 270, at 933, quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 
(Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1788-1789 at 659 (1958). 
326Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 542 (1977); Margaret S. DeWind, The Wisconsin Supreme Court Lets the Sun 
Shine In: State v. Showers and the Wisconsin Open Meeting Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 827, 832 
(1988). 
327Scott A. MacNair, Is There a Right to View the Dead at Dover? JB Pictures v. 
Department of Defense: Limits on the Media’s Right to Gather Information, 4 VILL. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 387, 388 (1997). 
328Blasi, supra note 326, at 524. 
329DeWind, supra note 326, at 832. 
330Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). 
331Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 
571-72 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[p]rotection of those sources is necessary to ensure 
that the press can fulfill its constitutionally designated function of informing the public . . . .”).  
Justice Potter Stewart also has spoken on the importance of the press as a check upon 
government power.  Dyk, supra note 270, at 931.   
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deliberation by the legislature and “induce[s] votes that transcend narrow 
interests.”332  
Consequently, this concept of the First Amendment recognizes that governmental 
restrictions on speech may allow abuses to go unrecognized.333  So the First 
Amendment principle of access serves to facilitate the public’s monitoring of 
government officials.334  Open meetings of the legislature are essential “because they 
provide the individual with information to make voting choices, which is the major 
means by which citizens exert power over their elected officials.”335  In sum, 
Madison’s vision of the First Amendment, Meiklejohn’s writings upon the First 
Amendment’s integral role in self government, and modern ideas of the value of the 
First Amendment’s value are all “directly involved when those in power in 
government attempt to withhold information about their activities from the people to 
whom the government belongs.”336 
Unfortunately, the Framers’ views of the First Amendment have not yet been 
fully realized as a matter of black letter law.  Nonetheless, over the 20th century, 
First Amendment jurisprudence evolved into a strong right of access to judicial 
proceedings.337  This First Amendment right of access is not absolute.338  Rather, it is 
a qualified right, evaluated on a case-by-case basis.339  A landmark case in the 
development of the First Amendment right of access is Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia.340  Richmond Newspapers involved a trial court’s closing of a murder 
trial to the public.341  The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment guarantees 
the right of the press and the public to attend criminal trials.342  This is because it is a 
                                                                
332Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local 
Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 943-44 (1988) (citation omitted) (“[t]he requirement 
of public voting and public explanation restricts the capacity of legislators to vote . . . their 
own dark urges . . . .”)   
333MacNair, supra note 327, at 388.   
334United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 420 (6th Cir. 1986) (Contie, J., dissenting). 
335DeWind, supra note 326, at 832.  This is not to say that First Amendment is a perfectly 
effective restraint upon governmental action.  “One of the primary reasons for the public’s 
failure to rise up in indignation at the special interest nature of certain pieces of legislation is 
simply the cost of discovering what Congress is doing.”  Macey, supra note 174, at 256 
(citation omitted). 
336Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1184 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).  
337Cohn, supra note 3, at 400. 
338Hon. William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Protective Orders in Bankruptcy 
Court:  The Congressional Mandate of Bankruptcy Code Section 107 and its Constitutional 
Implications, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 67, 73 (1996). 
339Id. 
340Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555. 
341Id. at 560. 
342Id. at 575-80. The First Amendment considerations - and the public’s right of access - 
are especially strong when a criminal trial involves the conduct of government officials. 
United States v. Myers (In re Application of National Broadcasting Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 952 
(2d Cir.1980); United States v. Shannon (In re the Application of CBS, Inc.), 540 F. Supp. 769, 
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core purpose of the First Amendment to assure “freedom of communication on 
matters relating to the functioning of government.”343  Thus, “[f]ree speech carries 
with it some freedom to listen.”344  In his concurring opinion in Richmond 
Newspapers, Justice Stevens stated: “the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary 
interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms 
of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment . . . . I agree that the 
First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of their rights of 
access to information about the operation of their government . . . .”345 
Richmond Newspapers’ requirement of openness has undergone an 
“extraordinary expansion” to require open proceedings in both criminal and civil 
court proceedings and documents.346  Subsequent to Richmond, the Supreme Court 
found that the qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal trials extends to 
transcripts of criminal voir dire proceedings,347 the testimony of minors in cases 
involving sexual offenses,348 and pretrial suppression hearings.349  Thus, Richmond 
and its progeny stand for the proposition that if a “proceeding has traditionally been 
open to the public and public access furthers the democratic process, public access to 
the proceeding is protected by the First Amendment.”350   
Under Richmond, “[w]hether the qualified First Amendment right of access 
extends to a particular proceeding . . . depends . . . on whether access would secure to 
the public information relevant to the discussion of governmental activity.”351  The 
Court relied upon two considerations to make such a determination.352  The first 
consideration is whether access to the proceedings would “contribute to the self 
governing function and further the democratic process.”353  This is known as the 
                                                          
771-72 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d at 421 (Contie, J., dissenting).  
343Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 574. 
344Id.  Richmond also noted that the right to listen, observe, and learn when peaceably 
assembled in public stems from the First Amendment.  Id. at 578 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 
U.S. 496, 519 (1939)). 
345Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582-83. 
346Cerruti, supra note 182, at 263. 
347Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. 501. 
348Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).  
349Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 
(1984). 
350Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 338, at 71 (citation omitted). 
351Dan Paul, et al., The Development and Structure of the First Amendment Right of 
Access to Government Proceedings and Records, 625 PLI/P at 71, 85 (2000).  Whether access 
should be granted in a particular case depends on “whether access to a particular government 
process is important in terms of that very process.”  Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589. 
352Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 85. 
353Id.; see Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 506-08; Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 
8 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582-84 
(Stevens, J., concurring); 448 U.S. 584-98 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring); Gannett 
Co., 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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“access doctrine.” The second consideration is whether the proceeding has 
historically been open to the public: whether there has been a presumption of 
access.354  This is known as the “history prong.” 
Following Richmond, circuit courts held that civil trials must also be open to the 
public.355  Unfortunately, courts have not made wide use of Richmond’s doctrine to 
mandate public access to branches of government other than the judiciary.356  
Nonetheless, the Court has never expressly limited application of the people’s right 
to information about the functioning of their government to the judicial branch.357  
And this right of access is still developing.358   
One perceived difficulty in extending the First Amendment rationale of 
Richmond Newspapers is that Richmond held that the government could not 
arbitrarily close criminal trials to the public because of the long standing history of 
open criminal trials, even prior to the adoption of the First Amendment.359  
Historically, Congress has not been as uniformly open to public scrutiny as have 
criminal trials.  However, the tradition of openness need not extend for centuries to 
satisfy the history prong.  In Cable News Network, the court found the history 
prong’s requirement of an “enduring and vital tradition of public entree” satisfied by 
a tradition of televison media coverage of presidential activities extending over 
several past administrations.360   
Moreover, the history prong’s importance is in dispute.361  Some commentators 
argue that the history prong has essentially been abandoned in favor of the access 
doctrine.362  In Globe Newspaper Co., the Court stated that the historical pattern of 
public access is important merely because “a tradition of accessibility implies a 
favorable judgment of experience.”  Under this view, one should account for the fact 
                                                                
354Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 85; Press-Enter. Co., 478 U.S. at  8; Press-Enter. Co., 
464 U.S. at 506-08; Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605. 
355See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker 
Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 
710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983). 
356Cerruti, supra note 182, at 263-69. 
357United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 418 (6th Cir. 1986) (Contie, J., dissenting); 
Scott A. MacNair, supra note 327, at 399. 
358Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 87. 
359Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576. 
360Cable News Network v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 518 F. Supp, 1238, 1244 (N.D. Ga. 
1981). 
361Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 85.  
362Cerruti, supra note 182, at 308.  But see Capital Cities Media, Inc., v. Chester, 797 F.2d 
1164, 1174 (3d Cir. 1986) (arguing history prong is integral).  Yet even the majority in Capital 
Cities admitted that “[o]ne could envision a special case . . . where access to governmental 
proceedings might be deemed so significant to a democratic government that the First 
Amendment would mandate access even without a showing of a tradition of openness.”  797 
F.2d at 1177 (Adams, J., concurring).  If Congress - the embodiment of representation in our 
democracy - is not that special case, then what is? 
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that the Senate decided to open its doors early in its history, and that secrecy in 
Congress has been the exception, not the rule.363 
An alternative to Richmond’s tests is the balancing test set out in Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes.364  The balancing test weighs the public’s 
interest in obtaining information against the government’s interest in restricting 
access.  Branzburg’s balancing test was the “primary analytical tool” used by the 
Court in addressing the media’s right of access to penitentiary institutions.365 
Ultimately, commentators observe that Richmond Newspapers and its progeny 
demonstrate that the First Amendment encompasses a broad array of rights ensuring 
that citizens can participate in our republican self government.366  And several courts 
have found that the First Amendment and Richmond Newspapers mandate a right of 
access to non-judicial proceedings.367  Unfortunately, there is scarce case law 
addressing whether the First Amendment doctrine of Richmond Newspapers extends 
to legislative deliberation.368  Only one federal court has explicitly advocated this 
view of the First Amendment.  In WJW-TV, Inc. v. Cleveland, a city council 
prohibited the press and public from attending a scheduled city council meeting.369  
The council meeting did not discuss privileged or confidential matters.370  
Nonetheless, the city council simply claimed it had a prerogative to forbid the public 
and press from attending city council meetings.371  In addressing this issue, the 
district court held that the press and public have a qualified First Amendment right of 
access to legislative meetings.372  The court reasoned that “Richmond Newspapers is 
a case about access not only to criminal trials, but equally to ‘matters relating to the 
functioning of government.’”373  The court concluded that the qualified right of 
access to legislative proceedings “is an inescapable consequence of first amendment 
jurisprudence.”374  The Sixth Circuit vacated WJW-TV, Inc. v. Cleveland as moot 
                                                                
363See supra notes 270-98 and text.   
364Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
365Scott A. MacNair, supra note 327, at 393. 
366Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 84. 
367Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1238; Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of 
Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985), vacated as moot, 832 F.2d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 
1987). 
368See Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 336-39.  A handful of courts have also examined the 
common law access right to government information.  Id. at 87. 
369WJW-TV, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 686 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1988), vacated on 
other grounds by, 870 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1989), re-reported in full, 878 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 
1989). 
370Id. at 178. 
371Id.  
372Id. at 177. 
373WJW-TV, Inc., 686 F. Supp. at 178. 
374Id. at 180. 
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because a state court had found that the city council’s closed meetings violated state 
law and the city’s municipal charter.375 
There are other cases which provide suggestion by analogy for the proposition 
that it is unconstitutional for Congress to have unfettered discretion to deliberate in 
secret.  Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Companies addressed a 
White House policy excluding television media from “limited coverage” events that 
the print media was allowed to attend.376  The Cable News Network court held that 
the press has a First Amendment right of access to presidential news conferences 
held in the White House.377  The court observed that both the press and the public 
have a qualified First Amendment right of access to news and information 
concerning the operations and activities of government.378  Of course, the right is 
qualified by limiting considerations such as confidentiality, security, orderly process, 
and spatial limitations.379   
Following Cable News Network, the court in Society of Professional Journalists 
v. Secretary of Labor extended the access doctrine to open up closed hearings held 
by a federal agency.380  These formal fact-finding hearings involved the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration’s investigation of a fire in a coal mine which killed 27 
miners.381  Despite the fact that the statute governing the hearings did not require that 
the Secretary hold the hearings in public, the court held that the hearings must be 
open.382  The court based its holding not only on the freedom of the press, but also on 
the “penumbra of the first amendment guarantees[.]”383  And it specifically required 
that the public be granted access to the hearings despite the scarcity of a tradition of 
openness in administrative hearings.384  The court observed that historically both 
civil trials and congressional sessions have been open to the public.385  Reasoning by 
analogy, the court held that administrative hearings must also be open to the 
public.386 
The court cited to James Madison’s famous admonition regarding open 
government387 and noted that  
                                                                
375WJW-TV, Inc., 878 F.2d at 909-12, citing State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co. v. 
Barnes, 527 N.E.2d 807 (Ohio 1988). 
376Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1240. 
377Id. at 1238. 
378Id. at 1244. 
379Id. 
380Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 573, remanded as moot, 832 F.2d 1180 
(10th Cir. 1987).  
381Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 570. 
382Id. at 572; 30 U.S.C. § 813(b) (1994). 
383Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 573. 
384Id. at 575. 
385Id. 
386Id.  
387See supra note 3 and text. 
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[o]penness is essential . . . to the proper functioning of democratic 
processes.  Majoritarian pressures are not felt if the majority of the people 
are unaware or misled about information crucial to their decisions.  The 
cloak of secrecy can be used to hide abuses or disguise mistakes until it is 
too late to prevent damage from being done.  Openness acts as both a 
preventative and a curative of such abuses.388   
The court further added, 
[I]n our democracy, the people control the government.  A shift from the 
people controlling the government to the government controlling the 
people is a shift from democracy to totalitarianism.  Administrative 
difficulties such as [the administrative burden of conducting open 
meetings] are a small price to pay to entrench the procedural safeguards 
that keep our society from creeping even slightly closer to totalitarianism.  
Such difficulties pale in the light of the constitutional rights of free speech 
and a free press.389 
Although the court in Society of Professional Journalists took pains to note that 
its holding was limited to the facts before it,390 it is also clear that its reasoning about 
open government has wide applications.  “A right to open proceedings is necessary 
to prevent any governmental body from abusing the power it is given.”391 
Sherrill v. Knight dealt with the Secret Service’s denial of a White House press 
pass to a reporter.  The D.C. Circuit held that because the White House had made 
press facilities open to reporters, the First Amendment required that refusal of a 
White House press pass be based on a compelling governmental interest.392  The 
court noted that the case did not involve a claim that the White house must open its 
doors to the press.393  Rather, the White House had already made press facilities open 
to all bona fide reporters.394  Given that most congressional conference committees 
are open to the press, and that the Conference Committee for bankruptcy reform was 
generally closed to the public yet insiders were allowed to attend, it seems that 
similar First Amendment concerns are raised as in Sherrill.   
On the other hand, one can stitch together quotes from the Supreme Court in such 
a way as to imply that there is no First Amendment right of access to legislative 
proceedings.  Cases decided prior to Richmond Newspapers took a more restrictive 
view of the First Amendment.395  Prior to Richmond Newspapers, the Court stated 
that “public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter and may 
                                                                
388Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 577. 
389Id. at 579. 
390Id. at 578. 
391Id. at 576. 
392Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
393Id. at 129. 
394Id. 
395See Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1242.   
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hold nonpublic sessions to transact business.”396  Furthermore, Justice Holmes wrote 
that the “Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or 
an assembly of the whole.”397  In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court stated, “[I]t has 
generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a 
constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public 
generally.”398  And in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., Chief Justice Burger stated, “[T]his 
Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all 
sources of information within government control.”399  Yet all the above cases were 
decided prior to Richmond Newspapers and they should be viewed as modified by 
that case.   
Furthermore, the Court’s statements in Houchins v. KQED must be put into 
context.  In that case a news organization sought to take cameras into a prison - an 
environment with dramatically different considerations than Congress.  Congress 
does not have the same “penological interests” of “confinement” as a prison.400  It 
would be absurd to permit congressional lawmaking to be as enclosed as the “special 
environment” of a prison.401   
In Globe Newspaper Co., decided after Richmond Newspapwers, Justice 
O’Connor declared in a concurring opinion that she did not interpret the case “to 
carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials.”402  She focused on the 
statement that “it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher 
concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are 
conducted.”403  But the deliberations of Congress are at least as important as a 
criminal trial.  In fact, congressional deliberations are more important, as they often 
involve the enactment of a statute that will directly affect virtually every American.  
Compare this to a criminal trial which commonly affects only one or several people.  
Certainly an overhaul of our bankruptcy system impacts more persons than an 
ordinary criminal trial.404  
The most outspoken criticism of the people’s right to know is the majority 
holding in Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester.405  That case involved a state 
environmental agency’s refusal to allow a newspaper to view documents regarding 
                                                                
396Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 183 
n.8 (1976). 
397Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
398Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684. 
399Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978). 
400Id. at 36 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
401See Entm’t Network Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1017-18 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
402Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 611 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
403Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575).  
404As Senator Feingold commented upon the congressional effort to change the 
bankruptcy code, “[w]e’re about to fundamentally change a legal system . . . I hope we act 
wisely.”  Shannon D. Murray, Congressional Bankruptcy Panel Convenes, THE DAILY DEAL, 
Nov. 14, 2001. 
405Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1164. 
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the state agency’s investigation of water contamination from which over four 
hundred persons had become ill.406  The Third Circuit held that the newspaper failed 
to state a First Amendment claim for access because it failed to allege a historical 
pattern of access to documents at the state environmental agency.  Thus the Third 
Circuit viewed meeting the history prong of Richmond as a mandatory requirement, 
regardless of the other merits of a First Amendment claim of access.407  Not all courts 
share this view.  In JB Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense, the D.C. Circuit 
criticized the Capital Cities approach and declined to follow it.408  Instead, the D.C. 
Circuit used the balancing test set out in Branzburg.409  
The Capital Cities Media, Inc. majority argued that the Founders intended access 
to government-held information to “depend upon political decisions made by the 
people and their elected representatives.”410  Yet the majority’s holding utterly failed 
to address the First Amendment’s role in preventing governmental abuse of power.  
This is an omission for which the dissent strongly criticized the majority’s opinion.411  
The dissent noted that the state agency made no demonstration of a compelling 
interest justifying its secrecy and that the majority consequently “sidestep[ped] its 
obligation under conventional first amendment jurisprudence to examine the restraint 
and to determine whether it is narrowly tailored to the identified governmental 
interest.”412  The dissent further criticized the majority’s opinion as “profoundly anti-
democratic.”413  The dissent observed that the majority opinion rejected the 
“information role of the speech-press clause in citizen participation in self 
government in favor of a model of government in which elected executive or 
legislative branch officials are deemed to have been delegated the power to decide 
for us what we need to know.”414  Furthermore, “the ultimate prior restraint by 
government . . . is ignorance of governmental affairs imposed by nondisclosure.”415  
Obviously, “people cannot discuss governmental activities of which they are kept in 
ignorance.”416 
In sum, there is a certain ambiguity, and indeed conflict, in case law on the right 
of access.417  Consequently lower courts vary in their approach to the right of access:  
some courts use the two prong analysis from Richmond; other courts use the 
                                                                
406Id. at 1165. 
407Id. at 1173-76. 
408JB Pictures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
409Id. at 239. 
410797 F.2d at 1167. 
411Id. at 1185 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
412Id. at 1190. 
413Id. at 1186. 
414Id. 
415Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1186. 
416Id.  
417Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1242; MacNair, supra note 327, at 399. 
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balancing test from Branzburg.418  Despite the lack of complete agreement on the 
public’s right of access to governmental proceedings, courts generally hold the 
opinion that under Richmond Newspapers, both the public and the press have a 
limited right of access to information concerning governmental activity.419 
So does the First Amendment right of access encompass the people’s right to 
observe the deliberations of Congress?  It must!  It must because the ability to see the 
workings of government underlies the societal purpose of the First Amendment.  It is 
indisputable that granting the people access to congressional deliberation contributes 
to self government and furthers democracy.  
If the Supreme Court ever does address the issue of secret congressional 
deliberation, it will not blindly defer to Congress’s determination to make its 
proceedings secret.420  Rather, it is likely that the Court will weigh the competing 
values of the congressional interest in secrecy versus the values of openness and 
accountability embodied in the First Amendment and the Journal Clause.421  (This 
approach seems appropriate, as Congress may indeed have legitimate reasons for 
secrecy on, say, portions of a bill that actually deal with the security of foreign 
embassies.)   
If the Court recognizes a qualified right of public access to observe congressional 
deliberations, it will further the First Amendment’s societal function of “preserving 
free public discussion of governmental affairs[.]”422  Consider the converse.  If the 
American people are forbidden from observing the process of lawmaking - as they 
were forbidden from observing key aspects of bankruptcy reform - it renders 
impossible the intelligent discussion of public issues.   
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny support recognition of a right to observe 
congressional lawmaking. Nothing would go further to “assur[e] freedom of 
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”423  As the 
dissent in Capital Cities noted, “Cases from DePasquale through Press-Enterprise 
. . . make clear that a governmental restriction on access to information about 
governmental matters presents a first amendment question, and that such a 
restriction, like any other prior restraint, can be sustained only if it demonstrably 
advances significant governmental interests and is narrowly tailored to serve those 
interests.”424  
Richmond Newspapers’s history prong is no obstacle to recognition of this right.  
Insofar as Congress has generally been open to the public, it supports this right.  And 
given that conference committees have generally been open over the last few 
                                                                
418MacNair, supra note 327, at 399-400. 
419Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1242 (Contrary to the view of the Capital Cities 
majority, we posit that the initial consideration should be one of access unless there is an 
articulated government reason for lack of access). 
420Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1185 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).  
421Id., citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
422Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
423Press Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 518 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
424Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1189 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
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decades, it also passes the test of the history prong.  Certainly there is no justification 
for the creation of a special secrecy exception exempting conference committees 
from the general tradition of openness in Congress. 
Alternatively, under Branzburg’s balancing test it is clear the public must have a 
right to observe congressional deliberation.  The public’s interest in legislation as 
wide ranging as bankruptcy reform is weighty indeed.  And the only interest that 
congressional proponents of secrecy in “reforming” bankruptcy have been able to 
come up with is expediency.425  
A proper view of the First Amendment places the burden on Congress to explain 
the compelling governmental interest justifying its denial of public access to 
committee meetings.426  Congressional proponents of bankruptcy reform also ought 
to explain how a secret Conference Committee which arbitrarily allows certain 
lobbyists and insiders to attend is narrowly tailored to serve this purported 
compelling interest in secrecy.427  
XIII.  MODERN STATUTES RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT TO KNOW 
Even if the First Amendment does not explicitly require that Congress refrain 
from making laws in secret, the trend in First Amendment jurisprudence over time 
has been towards openness in governmental deliberation.428  In fact, acts such as the 
Government in the Sunshine Act,429 the Federal Advisory Committee Act,430 and the 
Freedom of Information Act431 show that “Congress and many state legislatures have 
concluded that open deliberation often serves the public interest.”432 
                                                                
425Admittedly there could be circumstances such as the deliberation of sensitive details 
pertaining to national security which would constitute a compelling interest in secrecy.  See 
generally Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the 
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 275 (1971) (discussing responsibility of the 
government to withhold sensitive information).  But even then it would seem that narrowly 
tailored pockets of secrecy to conceal sensitive details would suffice.  One would not expect it 
to be necessary to conceal the entire proceedings of a conference committee’s work on a 
national security bill.  Certainly congressional debate about broad aspects of national security 
policy ought to be open to the American people.  
426See generally Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1191 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).  
427JB Pictures, Inc., 86 F.3d at 239, citing Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510; 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 581; Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07 
(requiring a compelling interest). 
428Cerruti, supra note 182, at 237-38.  An early example of this trend is the Act of 1813 (3 
Stat. 140). DiMario, supra note 176.  In this Act, Congress required copies of the Senate and 
House journals be sent to the executive branch, state legislatures, and to universities in each 
state.  Wendy R. Brown, Federal Initiatives to Promote Access to Electronic Government 
Information: The Impact on the Federal Depository Library Program.  91 LAW. LIBR. J. 291, 
292 (1999). 
4295 U.S.C. § 552b (2002). 
4305 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-14 (2002). 
4315 U.S.C. § 552. 
432B. H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 303 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
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The Government in the Sunshine Act requires that the deliberations of every 
government agency be open to the public.433  Government agency meetings may be 
closed to the public only if the meetings relate to certain enumerated exceptions, for 
issues such as national defense, trade secrets, criminal investigations, and personal 
information.434  The Government in the Sunshine Act was enacted to bring the 
“whole decision-making process” of the Administrative Branch into public view.435  
When Congress enacted the Government in the Sunshine Act, the House declared 
that “the policy of the United States [is] that the public is entitled to the fullest 
practicable information regarding the decision making processes of the Federal 
Government.  It is the purpose of this Act to provide the public with such 
information while protecting the rights of individuals and the ability of the 
Government to carry out its responsibilities.”436  In short, it is the policy of the 
Government in Sunshine Act that government should conduct the public’s business 
in public.437  
The Federal Advisory Committee Act,438 prevents federal agencies from using 
secret advisory committees.439  Advisory committees include committees, boards, 
and commissions utilized by federal agencies or the President.440  Under the Act, 
advance notice of an advisory committee meeting must be given.  The meeting must 
be open to the public, and the public must be allowed to attend the meeting and to 
appear or file statements with the committee.441  Advisory committees are prohibited 
from allowing only select members of the public to attend meetings.442  This stands 
in sharp contrast to the shadow committee on bankruptcy reform which allowed 
industry insiders to attend deliberations yet closed its doors on the public.  
                                                                
4335 U.S.C.A. § 552b (West 1996). 
4345 U.S.C.A. § 552b (c)(1) (West 1996). 
435S. Rep. No. 354 (1975); Cerruti, supra note 182, at 320. 
436Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 552 b (West 1996). 
437Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1994), rev’d 80 F.3d 535 
(D.C.C. 1996), on remand 27 F. Supp.2d 32 (D.D.C. 1998). 
4385 U.S.C. App. I (West 1996). 
4395 U.S.C.A. App. I (West 1996); see also James T. O’Reilly, Advisers and Secrets: The 
Role of Agency Confidentiality in the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 13 N. KY. L. REV. 27 
(1986). 
4405 U.S.C.A. App. I § 3 (West 1996).  State and local governmental advisory committees 
are not covered by the Act. 5 U.S.C.A. App. I § 4(c) (West 1996), and there is also an 
exception for committees utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Reserve 
System.  5 U.S.C.A. App. I § 4(b) (West 1996). 
4415 U.S.C.A. App. I § 10 (West 1996). 
442O’Reilly, supra note 439, at 30.  But there is an exception to allow consultants to attend 
closed meetings.  Id. 
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The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) grants the public a right of access to 
government agency records.443  When Lyndon B. Johnson signed FOIA into law, he 
declared  
[T]his legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A 
democracy works best when the people have all the information that the 
security of the Nation permits.  No one should be able to pull the curtains 
of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the 
public interest.444 
FOIA does contain an exception for agency policy documents still under internal 
development.445  Nonetheless, under FOIA, an agency is prohibited from allowing 
only select members of the public to see documents of proposed agency plans.446 
In addition to well-known acts such as FOIA, there are approximately an 
additional 400 federal statutes requiring the dissemination of information about a 
variety of federal programs.447  Furthermore, there is a great demand by the 
American public for this information.  For example, more than 20 million documents 
are downloaded monthly from the Government Printing Office’s website.448  These 
legislative documents “represent a major avenue of communication between the 
government and the public.”449  
Moreover, each of the fifty states has a sunshine law which grants the public the 
right to attend deliberative meetings.450  The authors of Open Meeting Statutes 
surveyed newspaper editors and found that “the overwhelming consensus of 
newspaper editors” was that open meeting statutes are effective in making it easier 
                                                                
443Congress enacted FOIA in 1966, and amended it in 1974.  In 1996 Congress amended 
FOIA to grant a right of access to electronic records.  
444Statement by the President upon Signing the “Freedom of Information Act,” 316 Pub. 
Papers 699 (July 4, 1966). 
445FOIA exempts classified defense and foreign relations information, internal agency 
rules and practices, information which another law prohibits disclosing, trade secrets, agency 
communications protected by legal privilege, information regarding personal privacy, law 
enforcement information, information about the supervision of financial institutions, and 
geological information.  5 U.S.C. § 552 b. 
446O’Reilly, supra note 439, at n.21, citing North Dakota v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 
1978). 
447DiMario, supra note 184, citing Jane Bortnick Griffith and Harold Relyea, 
“Compilation of Statutes Authorizing Dissemination of Government Information to the 
Public,” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (1996).  Notable among these numerous open 
government statutes is the Presidential Records Act of 1978 44 U.S.C.A. § 2201, which 
provides for public availability of virtually all presidential records and papers twelve years 
after a president leaves office.  The extent of the Presidential Records Act is a matter of 
current dispute.  See Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives and Records Admin. (D.D.C. 
filed Nov. 28 2001). 
448DiMario, supra note 184. 
449Id. 
450Anderson, supra note 312, at n.49 (1991), citing J. Watkins, THE MASS MEDIA AND THE 
LAW 214-15 (1990); Watkins, supra note 47. 
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for reporters to be admitted to legislative meetings.451  Reporters sometimes even 
flourished their state’s open meeting statute to gain admittance to an otherwise 
closed meeting.452  Overall, open meetings laws are credited with opening the 
meetings of state and local governmental legislatures and organizations, including 
deliberative bodies such as school boards, city councils, and university boards of 
trustees.453  State open meeting statutes have led to a “ubiquitous policy of openness” 
which has “improved the working dynamic of the American political structure.”454 
Are the legislative considerations in Congress (other than foreign relations and 
national security concerns)455 so singular that Congress could not conduct its 
business with an open meeting statute similar to the ones that govern every state?456  
                                                                
451Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1216. 
452Id. 
453Id. at 1199, 1200, 1217.  However, there are limits to the effectiveness of open meetings 
laws, as “no law will ever do away with sneak executive sessions or informal meetings of 
public officials who don’t want to meet in public.”  Id. at 1217 n.133. 
454Caveney, supra note 6, at 183. 
455To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no national security secrets contained 
in our nation’s Bankruptcy Code. 
456Admittedly, there are some arguments in support of secret law making by Congress.  
Arguably closed meetings may grant legislators more freedom to openly discuss all options, 
even unpopular ones, without becoming publicly committed to them.  DeWind, supra note 
318, at 830; O’Reilly, supra note 439, at 456.  “[E]xperience teaches that those who expect 
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances 
and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”  Nixon, 418 U.S. 
at 705.   
Yet most open meetings statutes do not prevent free and open discussion among officials.  
Since most open meeting statutes prevent closed meetings of a quorum, legislators are still 
free to privately discuss issues on a one-to-one basis.  DeWind, supra note 326 at 828.  
Moreover, legislators must not be allowed to use this argument for secret deliberation to trump 
the public’s right to vote against legislators who express unpopular ideas.  Id. at 831.  Rather, 
“[v]oters are supposed to pressure legislators with the threat of voting against them.”  Laura 
Schenck, Freedom of Information Statutes: The Unfulfilled Legacy, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 371, 
383 (1996). 
Secrecy may also facilitate the accommodation of conflicting interests.  Open Meeting 
Statutes, supra note 5, at 1201.  Yet the notion of secrecy facilitating reconciliation could not 
have been a concern during the shadow bankruptcy committee, since only selected insiders 
were present.  See supra note 40 and text.  Furthermore, open legislative meetings foster 
public debate of political issues and thus strengthen freedom of speech.  DeWind, supra note 
326, at 830.   
Open meetings may discourage uninformed officials from requesting information out of 
fear of appearing ignorant.  Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1201.  And secret 
meetings may prevent oratorical grandstanding.  Id.  Yet if open meetings make legislators 
appear uninformed, then those legislators ought to do their homework.  And if open 
deliberations cause politicians to grandstand, the public can see through it.  Cohn, supra note 
3, at 406.  In short, “[t]he weaknesses of those we elect must be exposed, not used as an 
excuse to function in secret.”  Id.   
Moreover, secrecy makes it incredibly difficult for the public to monitor the legislature’s 
work and the assumptions behind it. Rogovin, supra note 160, at 1740.  “The public’s ability 
to make decisions in a well-informed and rational fashion depends on its understanding of 
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Open Meeting Statutes concludes that “[e]nsuring the people access to the greatest 
possible amount of information about governmental activities is an unimpeachably 
sound concept, and as a basic tenet of democratic government, merits legislative 
recognition.”457  Typical of state sunshine laws is New York’s Open Meetings Law 
which fosters the policy that in a democracy, citizens must be “fully aware of and 
able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the 
deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.”458 
In short, the secretive deliberation employed by Congress in bankruptcy reform 
would not have been a permissible approach for a federal agency to take in 
deliberating policy.  Nor would it have been permissible for most state legislatures or 
local governments to go about secretly setting public policy in such a manner.  
Congressional deliberation - arguably the most important legislative deliberation 
must be held to the same standards of openness and accountability as virtually all 
other legislative deliberation in America today.459  After all, “without [freedom of 
information,] the citizens of a democracy have but changed their kings.”460   
                                                          
facts underlying legislation.”  Id. at 1740.  Open legislative deliberation enhances: the public’s  
respect for legislative process, the ability of the public to engage in informed discussion, the 
public’s ability to make informed votes, and the integrity of the legislature’s fact-finding 
process (which is especially important for fact-intensive legislation such as bankruptcy 
reform.)  WJW-TV, Inc., 686 F. Supp at 180, citing League of Women Voters v. Adams, 13 
Med. L. Rep. 1433 (Super.Ct. 1986). 
In sum, the minor conveniences that secrecy provides to legislators are overridden by the 
underlying fact that the people’s participation in decision making has traditionally been 
considered the basis of democracy.  DeWind, supra note 326, at 827.  Open meeting laws 
enable the public to learn why and how a legislature makes its decisions.  Id. at 828. 
Of course, the judiciary also uses secrecy to facilitate decision making.  Both individual 
judges and judicial panels discuss and write court opinions in confidentiality, until the opinion 
is actually published.  But courts operate under different considerations than a legislature.  
First of all, judges do not set public policy.  Second, unlike members of Congress, members of 
the Judiciary are subject to strict ethical constructs against partiality and the reception of 
lobbying.  Efforts by interested parties to influence judges are almost always in full public 
view–in the form of argument in open court or in written pleadings.  Finally, judges typically 
issue reasoned opinions which explain the rationale behind their decisions. 
Here Congress is foisting a complex, difficult to understand legal code upon an American 
public with virtually no explanation of the origins of myriad special interest provisions which 
were heavily lobbied for in secrecy. 
457Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1220. 
458N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 (McKinney 1988).  But New York’s law has had problems 
stemming from loopholes allowing secret deliberation.  See Timothy P. Whelan, New York’s 
Open Meetings Law: Revision of the Political Caucus Exemption and Its Implications for 
Local Government, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1483, 1501 (1995). 
459At least one commentator observes that FOIA is one of the most important statutes 
which Congress has not seen fit to apply to itself.  Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind 
Equally on All, 48 ARK. L. REV. 105, 113 (1994). 
460H. Cross, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW, xiii (1953), quoted in David A. Barrett, 
Facilitating Government Decision Making: Distinguishing Between Meeting and Nonmeetings 
under the Federal Sunshine Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1195 n.1 (1998). 
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XIV.  DRAGGING CLANDESTINE LAWMAKING OUT INTO THE SUNLIGHT 
How can we expose secret lawmaking to sunlight? There are basically three 
options.  First, Congress could better police itself.  Second, the judiciary could 
explicitly recognize the people’s First Amendment right to observe legislative 
deliberation.  Third, Congress could enact an open meetings statute designed to end 
secret congressional deliberation. 
Under the first approach, Congress could do a better job of following internal 
rules to prevent inappropriate secret deliberation.  There are already norms and rules 
in place to encourage open deliberation by Congress.  By creating an internal 
mechanism, Congress avoids the separation of powers concerns that might occur 
with an executive agency overseeing congressional deliberation.  An internal 
mechanism also would avoid the risk of the executive overbearing on congressional 
autonomy.461 
Unfortunately, bankruptcy reform illustrates that internal congressional norms are 
easily violated.  Expecting Congress to self-enforce internal norms against secret 
deliberation is simply unrealistic.  The basic structure of the legislative process is 
influenced by standing rules, congressional precedent, and legislative custom.462  
Many of these conventions are normally followed but “may be violated when 
circumstances warrant.”463  Since Congress enforces its own rules of procedure, the 
rules have no effect unless members of Congress bring them into play.464  Each 
member of Congress must protect his or her own interests by making the appropriate 
procedural order if a pending action will violate the rules.465   
In short, “the rules have absolutely no effect unless a member brings them into 
play.”466  As it is, the rules of the House have no independent enforcement 
mechanism, and they are often waived or ignored.467  Each house of Congress is 
constitutionally empowered to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”468 And it is 
probably the majority view that “[i]t is up to the House and the Senate to enact, 
modify or repeal their rules, or decide whether to even abide by them.  These rules 
have generally not been subjected to judicial review.”469  Thus, “for the most part 
Congress determines its rules of procedure free of any external pressures.”470 
                                                                
461Bruff, supra note 459, at 107. 
462Miller, supra note 299, at 1344. 
463Id., quoting Bach, The Nature of Congressional Rules, 5 J.L. & POL. 725, 735 (1989). 
464Miller, supra note 299, at 1346. 
465Id.  
466Id., citing Bach, supra note 463, at 739-40. 
467146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9792 (Statement of Rep. Nadler). 
468U.S. CONST. art. I, 5, cl. 2.  Apparently this provision of the Constitution was adopted 
without debate.  Cohn, supra note 3 at n.17, citing James Madison, THE DEBATES IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 385, 387-88, 431, 616, 618 (1987).  
469Cohn, supra note 3, at 370. 
470Miller, supra note 299, at 1343. 
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Under the second option, the judiciary could better recognize the people’s right to 
observe congressional deliberation.  There are several ways courts could do this. 
Courts could recognize a constitutional principle that Congress subject itself to the 
laws it enacts.471  Under this “due process of lawmaking,” a citizen could challenge a 
statute on the ground that Congress exempted itself from the statute.472  Courts could 
review legislative procedure with an eye to this end.473  While the Court has never 
insisted that a legislature articulate its reasons for enacting a statute,474 members of 
the Court hold divergent views on this issue.475  Professor Morgan notes that 
legislative statements of purpose would encourage careful deliberation and valid 
decision making.476   
Alternatively, courts should grant full recognition to the principle that citizens 
have a First Amendment and due process right to challenge the secret deliberation of 
a statute.  As Ivester notes, recognizing a “directly enforceable right to know,” would 
“do justice to the evident sentiments of the framers[.]”477  This judicial approach 
would involve courts extending the rationale of Richmond Newspapers to lift the veil 
of secrecy from legislative deliberation.  “Free speech carries with it some freedom 
to listen.”478  Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers points out that 
for public debate to be valuable, the debate must be informed.479  Justice Brennan 
wrote that “[s]ecrecy is profoundly inimical” to a judicial system that demonstrates 
the fairness of the law.480  
As shown above, commentators have argued that although Richmond 
Newspapers and Globe concern access to courts, the rationale underlying those cases 
should extend to a right of access to legislative deliberation.481  As Professor Eugene 
Cerruti observes, “The central premise of Richmond Newspapers is that meaningful 
self government requires an informed electorate, and that where the representative 
government itself maintains control of information essential to such an informed 
public discourse, the government may be affirmatively required to provide that 
information to the public.”482  In his dissent in Capital Cities, Judge Gibbons argued 
                                                                
471Bruff, supra note 459, at 115. 
472Id.  
473Morgan, supra note 153, at 345-46. 
474Id. at 346, citing U. S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). 
475Morgan, supra note 153, at 346, citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243 (1981) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
476Morgan, supra note 153, at 347. 
477Ivester, supra note 183, at 134. 
478Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576.  For an excellent account of the history 
surrounding Richmond Newspapers, see Cerruti, supra note 182, at 242. 
479Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
480Id. at 595 
481Morgan, supra note 153, at 315-16 n.196; R. James Assaf, Mr. Smith Comes Home: The 
Constitutional Presumption of Openness in Local Legislative Meetings, 40 CASE. W. RES. L. 
REV. 227, 230 (1990). 
482Cerruti, supra note 182, at 239. 
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that the rationale of the Richmond Newspapers line of cases is in fact more 
applicable to Congress and the executive than it is to the judiciary, as the legislative 
and executive branches possess more power - and more capacity to abuse power - 
than does the judiciary.483  Underlying Richmond Newspapers is Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s observation that “freedom of speech springs from . . . . the basic 
American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.”484  
This suffrage must be informed.485  Consequently, government must not withhold 
information in such a way as to treat citizens as subjects.486   
Admittedly, it may not be likely that the Court will apply these First Amendment 
doctrines to Congress any time soon.  But this lack of judicial action is all the more 
reason for Congress itself to enact an open government statute to shed sunlight on its 
proceedings.487 
The third and superior approach to curing congressional secrecy is for Congress 
to enact legislation which takes an active stance in prohibiting Congress from 
deliberating public policy behind closed doors.  This could be done by enacting or 
amending a statute like FOIA, FACA, or the Sunshine Act to specifically cover 
Congress.   
Currently, open government acts such as FOIA, FACA, and the Sunshine Act do 
not apply to Congress.  Congress’ penchant for exempting itself from its own laws 
has engendered increasing criticism.488  Many commentators argue that open 
government statutes such as FOIA should apply to Congress.489  Such an application 
would greatly improve congressional accountability.490  The fact that freedom of 
information statutes do not cover Congress has been criticized as a “fatal flaw[.]”491  
These commentators take the view that it is “fundamentally inappropriate in a 
democratic society” to exempt Congress from open government statutes such as 
FOIA.492 
One commentator observes that “the typical voter reacts with surprise or 
disgust[,]” upon “[d]iscovering that Congress is not subject to its own 
                                                                
483Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d at 1191 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) . 
484Cerruti, supra note 182, at 287, quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1965). 
485Cerruti, supra note 182, at 290. 
486Id. at  290-91. 
487Commentators note that the judicial reluctance to establish a clear constitutional right to 
attend legislative meetings means that legislatures must pass legal enactments to assure access 
to governmental deliberations.  Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1204. 
488Bruff, supra note 459, at 105; James T. O’Reilly, Applying Federal Open Government 
Laws to Congress: An Explorative Analysis and Proposal, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 416 
(1993). 
489Schenck, supra note 456, at 372; O’Reilly, supra note 488, at 443; Bruff, supra note 
459, at 134. 
490O’Reilly, supra note 488, at 415, 445. 
491Schenck, supra note 456, at 372. 
492Id. at 374. 
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enactments.”493  In fact in 1995 Congress demonstrated that it understood the wisdom 
of extending many of its enactments to itself.  The congressional Accountability Act 
of 1995 applies the core provisions of eleven statutes to cover Congress, including 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act.494  Inconsistent with this notion of congressional accountability, the 
Congressional Accountability Act did not extend freedom of information and open 
meeting laws to end secret congressional deliberation.   
Commentators have advocated different approaches to applying open 
government laws to Congress.  Congress could create an independent commission 
and/or internal rules that mirror FOIA, FACA, and other open government statutes.  
In the past, Congress has created internal rules to shadow legislation which applies to 
it.495  For instance, the House passed a rule creating an Office of Fair Employment 
Practices to enforce the central provisions of employment discrimination statutes 
upon the House.496  Of course, without an external enforcement mechanism, this 
might not be any more effective that the current system. 
Professor James T. O’Reilly undertakes a detailed examination of the possibility 
of applying FOIA, FACA, and the Government in the Sunshine Act to Congress.497  
O’Reilly advocates applying FOIA to cover Congress.  However, he notes that 
constitutional obstacles prevent simply amending FOIA by pasting the word 
“Congress” to the Act’s list of covered entities.498  Consequently, O’Reilly argues 
that a carefully tailored version of FOIA should cover Congress.499 
Laura Schenck also makes an insightful argument for the enactment of laws 
requiring Congress to meet in the open.500  She asserts that the legislative branch can 
voluntarily subject itself to a freedom of information statute enforced by the 
executive branch.501  This is consistent with separation of powers principles, as the 
Framers anticipated an executive strong enough to “counteract overreaching 
legislatures.”502  After all, James Madison argued that the legislative, executive, and 
judicial departments should not be kept totally distinct.503  Schenck concludes that 
                                                                
493O’Reilly, supra note 488, at 416. 
494Bruff, supra note 459, at 157; Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 2 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1302 (West 1997). 
495Bruff, supra note 459, at 109. 
496Id., citing Fair Employment Practices Resolution, H.R. RES. 558, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1987) (codified as House Rule 51, H.R. RES. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)). 
497O’Reilly, supra note 488, at 415. 
498Id. at 430. 
499Id. at 454.  Other commentators agree that FACA and FOIA would have to be modified 
before their application to Congress.  Bruff, supra note 459, at 133. 
500Schenck, supra note 456, at 386. 
501Id. at 386-87. 
502Id. at 386, quoting Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential 
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994). 
503THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 156, at 307, 300-08 (James Madison). 
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“[t]he fact that the executive branch could be ‘intrusively involved’ with the affairs 
of the legislature does not present a separation of powers obstacle, as long as the 
legislature authorizes the intrusion.”504 
One might argue that courts are prevented from mandating open congressional 
deliberation by concerns regarding separation of powers.  The details of this issue are 
largely beyond the scope of this article.  However, it bears mentioning that it is 
“archaic” to view “the separation of powers as requiring three airtight departments of 
government.”505  The Framers did not intend the separate branches of government to 
operate with absolute independence.506  This is reflected in The Federalist Papers’ 
citation to Montesquieu that separation of powers “did not mean that these 
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each 
other.”507  Instead, the Framers intended for separation of powers to facilitate the 
different branches’ “means of keeping each other in their proper places.”508  Secrecy 
allows Congress to aggrandize its power at the expense of the Executive and Judicial 
branches.509  Therefore, separation of powers considerations weigh in favor of ending 
the practice of unfettered congressional secrecy. 
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court rejected the claim that 
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act infringed upon separation 
of powers.510  The Court held that the proper inquiry as to whether a statute violates 
the doctrine of separation of powers focuses on the extent to which the statute 
prevents the branch from “accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”511  
A statute requiring open congressional deliberation on matters of public concern 
would not prevent Congress from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions.  Rather, such a statute would assist Congress in accomplishing those 
functions in a constitutional manner consistent with the First Amendment and the 
Framer’s intentions of open government.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that courts have not established a privilege of 
deliberative secrecy for Congress.512  Congress usually honors judicial subpoenas for 
congressional papers, yet simultaneously protests that its compliance is voluntary.513  
                                                                
504Schenck, supra note 456, at 386-87. 
505Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977), quoting Nixon, 408 F. Supp. 
at 342. 
506Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.  See also U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-08 (1974). 
507Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed., 
1961) (emphasis in original). 
508THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 156, at 320 (James Madison). 
509See infra note 515 and text. 
510Nixon, 433 U.S. at 440. 
511Id. at 443 
512Bruff, supra note 459, at 133.   
513Id.  Note also that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution does not absolutely 
prohibit judicial review of congressional conduct.  Schenck, supra note 456, at 381.  Since 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, it has been a settled proposition that the Court has the power to review 
legislative conduct. 103 U.S. 168, 199 (1881); Schenck, supra note 456, at 381.  The Speech 
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In addition, secret congressional deliberation itself has an adverse impact on 
separation of powers.  Secret meetings grant the Senate the power to “amend, revise, 
and reject . . . with abandon.”514  This allows Congress to expand its power at the 
expense of the executive branch.515   
If Congress passes legislation recognizing the people’s right to observe 
legislation, it must be effective legislation.  A toothless platitude in favor of open 
meetings is inadequate.  There must be effective means of enforcement.  Lessons can 
be learned from state open meetings laws.  For deliberations to be truly open, the 
public must have advance knowledge of the time and place of the deliberations.516  
Otherwise, legislators can create de facto secrecy by meeting at unannounced times 
in unknown places.517  Some state open meetings laws require twenty-four hours 
notice to the public before holding unscheduled meetings.518  Other laws provide for 
emergency meetings only after two hour’s advance notice to the press.519  Most state 
open meeting statutes provide for executive sessions to deal with subjects which 
rightfully should not be publicized.520  This provides for confidential deliberation, for 
example, to screen appointees, negotiate land purchases, and discuss sensitive public 
security issues.521  A similar set of exemptions would be appropriate for Congress.  
Of course this exemption should allow Congress to keep confidential those issues 
pertaining to national security. 
State open meeting laws take varying approaches to enforcement.  Some provide 
for criminal penalties for legislators who secretly deliberate.522  This would be 
                                                          
express their views in Congress without fear of harassing litigation.  Id. at 381.  Consequently, 
the Speech or Debate clause prevents courts from imposing liability upon legislators for what 
they have stated during the legislative process.  Id. at 382.   
The current test is whether under Gravel v. U.S., deliberational secrecy is a core legislative 
function.  408 U.S. 606, 609-10; Schenck, supra note 456, at 383.  Would the Court consider 
secrecy to be a protected legislative act, “an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings 
with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation. . . .[?]” 
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 609-10; Schenck, supra note 456, at 384.   
It is clear from the statements of the Founders that secrecy was not intended to be such an 
integral part of congressional deliberation on domestic issues.  Furthermore, Gravel found that 
for the purposes of Speech or Debate clause immunity, distribution of information to the 
public does not constitute “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative process.” 
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616; Schenck, supra note 456, at 384. 
514Cohn, supra note 3 at 373. 
515This is similar to the early Parliament’s use of secrecy to expand its power at the 
expense of the crown.  See supra note 298.  
516Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1207. 
517Id. 
518Id. at 1208. 
519Id.  
520Id.  
521Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1208. 
522Id. at 1211; Pupillo, supra note 204, at 1174. 
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problematic because of the sometimes inherent ambiguity as to when an executive 
session is legitimate.523  To avoid unwitting violations by members of Congress who 
honestly thought an issue worthy of executive session, criminal sanctions would 
have to be limited to intentional violations.524  Moreover, given the unpalatability of 
prosecuting members of Congress, criminal sanctions might never be invoked. 
Other state open meeting laws provide for injunctive relief.525  Evidence of 
previous violations of a sunshine statute can serve as a basis for an injunction 
enjoining future violations.526  However, the prospective nature of injunctive relief 
makes this remedy imperfect.527  Members of Congress might be tempted to quickly 
enact secretly deliberated legislation, pass it, and let it stand as a fait accompli. 
The superior approach is to set up statutory guidelines providing for the 
invalidation of legislation enacted without open deliberation.  By enacting such a 
statute, Congress could specifically grant the judiciary this power.  Many states have 
seen the wisdom of this approach and have enacted statutes specifically providing for 
the voiding of actions and legislation made in violation of state open meeting laws.528  
Numerous courts have utilized this approach.529  Courts have invalidated actions 
taken during non-public meetings by legislators even when it was clear that the 
secrecy of the proceedings was unintended.530  An objection to the invalidation 
approach is that it has heavy costs, as persons who rely upon a statute may later find 
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Hamrick v. Town of Albertville, 122 So. 448, 456 (1929); City of Lexington v. Davis, 221 
S.W.2d 659 (1949); Blum v. Board of Zoning and App., 149 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (1956); Green v. 
Beste, 76 N.W.2d 165 (1956); see also Pupillo, supra note 204, at n.25. 
530Town of Paradise Valley v. Acker, 411 P.2d 168, 170 (1966); City of Lexington v. 
Davis, 221 S.W.2d 659, 661 (1949). 
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it invalidated.531  But if this objection were paramount, the Supreme Court would 
have its hands tied in all areas of constitutional law.  The Court invalidates statutes 
that infringe upon other constitutional rights.  Why not grant this facet of the First 
Amendment the same protection?  Invalidation serves as an effective deference to 
secret governmental deliberation.532  
Critics of the right to know argue that the abstract constitutional ideal of a 
people’s right to know does not mandate a concrete, legally enforceable right to 
know.533  They assert that the right to know is too open-ended to be enforceable.534  
They argue that the ideal of a right to know cannot possibly grant every individual 
the right to “compel disclosure of the papers and effects of government officials 
whenever they bear on public business.”535  Thus they raise the specter of an 
enforceable right to know granting nosy citizens the right to peek inside every 
government desk drawer.536 
We do not advocate such an unbounded approach.  A right to view congressional 
deliberation is not an open-ended right.  It is a concise right which can be clearly 
delineated.  The general success of other right to know statutes such FOIA and state 
open meetings laws demonstrates that the right to know can be articulated with 
clarity. 
In sum, we advocate congressional enactment of a statute that explicitly 
recognizes the people’s right to view the congressional lawmaking process.  This can 
be done by amending a statute such as the Federal Advisory Committee Act to cover 
Congress, or by creating a new statute modeled upon state open meeting laws.  The 
precise approach taken does not matter, but it is important that the statute have 
adequate enforcement mechanisms.  It will also be necessary to elucidate what 
situations the statute covers.  Obviously the statute should require an open meeting 
for discussions among a quorum.  But it must also mandate open meetings for 
conference committees, which are often small in number.  Such a statute will grant 
the public more access to the legislative process and further the democratic process.   
XV.  CONCLUSION 
We have seen that recent efforts to alter the bankruptcy system under the cover of 
secrecy have received harsh criticism from members of Congress, the press, and 
various commentators.  We have seen that proponents of bankruptcy reform are so 
intent upon enacting legislation favoring special interests that they have taken the 
unprecedented step of attempting to enact the legislation under the guise of a 
completely unrelated, already-enacted bill.  We have seen that the shadowy tactics 
                                                                
531Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1213. 
532See Revelle v. Marston, 898 P.2d 917, 924 (1995). 
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that a citizen’s desire to gather information about the way the country is being run does not 
grant him the right to unauthorized entry into the White House). 
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involved in mysteriously inserting provisions in the bankruptcy legislation border 
upon the tactics of a patrician senate, issuing commands by fiat to a subjected 
populace.  And we have seen that these tactics of secrecy flout the people’s right to 
know, are contrary to the intent of the Framers, are inconsistent with the societal 
purpose of the First Amendment, are in contravention of the intent of the Journal 
Clause, and contradict the philosophy of modern statutes recognizing the public’s 
right to know.  These tactics of congressional secrecy are contrary to the process of 
open, reasoned, and deliberate decision making that is a cornerstone of American 
democracy.   
Given that open government and open meeting laws apply to every state, to 
government documents, to the meeting of federal advisory committees, and to the 
meeting of federal agencies, it is an anomaly for Congress to deliberate in secret.  
Even in 1790, the American people were “freemen who ought to know the individual 
conduct of [their] legislators,” not an “inferior order of beings incapable of 
comprehending the sublimity of Senatorial functions . . . .”537  In this new 
millennium, it is time to discard the secretive practices of an aristocratic Senate.  Let 
the people view the work of their representatives.  Bankruptcy reform - and all 
legislation of public concern - must be deliberated in full view of the American 
people.  Congress must do its work openly in the sunlight.  This is consistent with 
the intent of the Framers, as manifested in the Journal Clause and the First 
Amendment.  
As Woodrow Wilson stated in a criticizm of secret congressional committee 
hearings: 
I say that until you drive all those things into the open, you are not 
connected with your government; you are not represented; you are not 
participants in your government.  Such a scheme of government by 
private understanding deprives you of representation, deprives the people 
of representative institutions.  It has got to be put into the heads of 
legislators that public business is public business.538 
Indeed, public business is public business. 
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